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The Article challenges calls for the deregulation of party
campaign finance as part of the ongoing transformation of
federal campaign finance law under the Roberts Court. First,
on the legal front, the Article presents a new constitutional
approach to campaign finance corruption that builds on the
basic premise that what can be plausibly exchanged between
an individual contributor and individual officeholder, can be
plausibly exchanged between a contributor and a group of
officeholders, who agree to coordinate. This intuition about
collective quid pro quo corruption stays faithful to the basic
conception of quid pro quo exchange as its defining harm, just
as the Roberts Court insists, but allows for pragmatic sensibilities about a campaign finance system in which officeholders
and candidates are thoroughly interconnected by party ties.
Second, on the policy front, the Article engages normative appeals to deregulate party campaign finance and centralize
campaign finance in the parties as a response to the rise of
Super PACs and other outside groups. I skeptically assess the
consequences of deregulating party campaign finance and argue that campaign finance law should rediscover central concerns about distributional representation, rather than focusing
too narrowly on the balance of power among party elites.
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INTRODUCTION
Jim Bopp, the conservative campaign finance lawyer coordinating the ongoing deconstruction of the federal campaign
finance system, predicted confidently in a recent interview that
“‘[w]e’re in the endgame,’ . . . . ‘It’s already begun.’”1 It is hard
to argue with him. A Rehnquist Court that routinely upheld
campaign finance regulation against constitutional challenges
has given way to a Roberts Court that consistently strikes
down nearly every kind of campaign finance regulation it has
reviewed, from aggregate contribution limits, to restrictions on
corporate electioneering, to public financing.2 This methodical
dismantling of campaign finance law, orchestrated by the tag
team of Jim Bopp and Justice Anthony Kennedy, has narrowed
the government’s regulatory interest in campaign finance to
little more than restrictions on candidates and parties. Now,
their crosshairs may target one of the final remaining categories of regulation—restrictions on party-related campaign
finance.
Given the Roberts Court’s skepticism about campaign finance regulation, it might seem inevitable that judicial deregulation of party campaign finance ends up a final piece in Jim
Bopp’s putative endgame. Indeed, as I will explain, the constitutional analysis that would authorize party-sponsored Super
PACs also could well prove an existential threat to campaign
1
James Bennet, The New Price of American Politics, ATLANTIC, Oct. 2012, at
66, 68.
2
See infra Part I.
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finance reform, leaving almost nothing left of the federal campaign finance system in the end. Arguments that did not gain
traction with the Rehnquist Court are finding their audience
with the Roberts Court intent on cabining the government’s
anticorruption interest to a very narrow view of quid pro quo
exchange.
However the Roberts Court proceeds, a strict view of quid
pro quo corruption under Buckley v. Valeo 3 does not necessarily compel the deregulation of party campaign finance. This
Article presents a simple extension of the Court’s approach to
quid pro quo corruption that would encompass the regulation
of party campaign finance.4 The Court’s paradigmatic framing
of quid pro quo exchanges envisions them occurring in
pairwise fashion between an individual contributor and individual officeholder, with officeholders each acting alone and
exclusively positioned to offer the necessary quids in exchange
for campaign money. The Article builds on the basic premise
that what can be plausibly exchanged between an individual
contributor and individual officeholder can similarly be exchanged between a contributor and a group of officeholders
who agree to cooperate. To the extent that the government can
regulate the risk of the former quid pro quo exchange at the
individual level, the government should be able to reasonably
regulate the risk of the latter quid pro quo exchange involving a
group of officeholders acting together at a collective level.
In fact, the contemplation of group-level quid pro quo better maps the realities of campaign finance where the major
parties pervasively coordinate both campaign finance and lawmaking. The Court’s conception of corruption, in which individual candidates and officeholders operate entirely in isolation
from others, is absurdly simplistic given the major parties’
comprehensive involvement in nearly every aspect of American
politics. The major parties are constituted at their core by candidates and officeholders and have as their raison d’etre the
efficient coordination of their candidates’ and officeholders’
campaign finance and lawmaking activity. The formal party
committees regulated by campaign finance law are essentially a
collection of party candidates and officeholders who largely
raise the committees’ funds, direct their spending, and coordi3

424 U.S. 1 (1976).
See generally Michael S. Kang, Party-Based Corruption and McCutcheon v.
FEC, 108 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 240, 240–45 (2014) (presenting initial thoughts
for this direction as applied prospectively to McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434
(2014), since decided).
4
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nate their activity with other aspects of party business. Even
though group-level, party-mediated corruption does not characterize all of what parties do, just so, individual-level corruption does not necessarily characterize a great deal of what
individual candidates and officeholders do. Nonetheless, the
plausible risk of corruption provides a constitutional basis for
the reasonable regulation of both.
The law of campaign finance currently does not track the
potential for group-level, party-based corruption in today’s
politics. Part of campaign finance law’s failure to track contemporary campaign finance is the ironic result of the Rehnquist
Court’s earlier sympathy for the government’s interest in regulating campaign finance. By eagerly adopting broader expansions of the government’s regulatory interest beyond the
paradigm of quid pro quo corruption, the Rehnquist Court obviated the need to complicate the core conception of quid pro
quo corruption. Now that the Roberts Court has rejected those
broader expansions, the Roberts Court is retreating to a core
conception of quid pro quo corruption that is disappointingly
underdeveloped and does not track contemporary concerns
about modern campaign finance. A group-based approach to
quid pro quo corruption offers a new path forward for campaign
finance law. It is a new path for either the Roberts Court, or
more likely, a future Court less hostile to campaign finance
reform and willing to build on intellectual groundwork set forth
now only in dissent.
This Article demonstrates how such an approach would
apply to several pressing issues of party campaign finance law
the Roberts Court will soon confront. I explain that the federal
prohibition on contributions by federal contractors, as well as
similar state pay-to-play laws, rely implicitly on a group-level
intuition about quid pro quo corruption. These prohibitions
target a specific class of potential contributors with concrete
private gains to be immediately realized through quid pro quo
corruption. As such, the blanket prohibitions draw from the
intuition that party relationships require broader prohibitions
to cut off party-related campaign finance which might consummate quid pro quo deals through the party relationships intrinsic to federal lawmaking. I next revisit the federal prohibition
on party soft money, which is under similar criticism and legal
challenge as the federal pay-to-play law. I argue that the Rehnquist Court was justified in upholding the federal soft money
ban but could have relied on a group-level theory of corruption
more faithful to the original Buckley conception of quid pro quo
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exchanges. Finally, I criticize the arrival of the party-sponsored
Super PAC, at least as it has been introduced at the state level
and advocated at the federal level. I explain that the constitutional analysis that might shield a party Super PAC from government restriction opts for reflexive formalism over a sensible
understanding of the government’s interest in campaign finance regulation. The same analysis could lead ultimately to
campaign finance law that regulates only direct contributions
to candidates themselves and almost nothing else.5
In the end, however, the push for deregulating party campaign finance might surprisingly be more political than constitutional.6 Not long ago, the policy question whether to
deregulate party campaign finance would have been addressed
on its merits within a larger context of a fully functional federal
campaign finance system. But today, any policy question
about campaign finance law occurs within a campaign finance
system that already has been thoroughly deregulated under
the Roberts Court. Citizens United v. FEC helped usher in the
nearly complete deregulation of independent electioneering,
free of source restrictions on corporations that had applied for
nearly a century and of contribution limits on nonconnected
committees since the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA)
amendments.7 Following such rapid transformation of the
campaign finance ecosystem, political consensus about the
proper direction of regulation has dissolved.
The normative case now for the traditional campaign finance regulation of parties is far less clear than it was within
the comprehensively regulated system of not long ago. Today,
commentators from the political left and right are pushing for
deregulating party campaign finance based on the shifting balance of power between the major parties and outside groups,
including nonconnected Super PACs and 501(c) organizations

5
This sort of formalism already prevails, at least so far, as applied to the use
of Super PACs for preliminary campaigning by formally undeclared presidential
candidates. See infra subpart III.C.
6
We have already seen this in recent Cromnibus legislation. See Russell
Berman, The Most Corrupting Campaign-Finance Provisions Ever Enacted, ATLANTIC (Dec. 10, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/12/
Campaign-Finance-Rider-Hidde-Inside-Congress-New-Spending-Bill/383629/
[http://perma.cc/Q8NN-JFZX] (criticizing congressional privatization of party
fundraising for the national party conventions).
7
See generally Michael S. Kang, The End of Campaign Finance Law, 98 VA.
L. REV. 1, 14–21, 27–40 (2012) (narrating this transformation of campaign finance
law surrounding Citizens United).
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deregulated since Citizens United.8 These outside groups boast
nearly unlimited fundraising capacity but come without the
same level of political accountability and responsibility as the
major parties. Commentators hope that giving party committees similar fundraising capacity through deregulation would
increase their influence vis-à-vis outside groups and reverse
the decentralization of party politics in this Super PAC era.9 So
too, the formal party committees might exploit their deregulation to reposition themselves more firmly in the center of today’s campaign finance world that has shifted centrifugally so
far in the direction of outside groups. Centralizing campaign
finance back in the formal parties might moderate partisan
polarization against countervailing sources of fragmentation
and ideological extremism.
The normative concern with this analysis is that it may
focus too heavily on this balance of power among political actors to the neglect of important distributional concerns about
representation. It is difficult to believe that deregulating the
parties to engage in the same type of courting and solicitation
of the very wealthy as Super PACs will do much to mitigate the
ongoing distributional shift of the campaign finance system
toward the interests of the very wealthy. A worrisome empirical
literature is documenting how the democratic system appears
to respond overwhelmingly to the stratified preferences of the
wealthiest Americans, who also happen to account for the preponderance of campaign financing.10 Allowing parties to engage in deregulated campaign finance, focused on fundraising
ever larger amounts from the same very wealthy donors, may
do more good than harm in this sense. A party Super PAC, for
instance, could encourage parties to behave more Super PAC
than party, given the influence and ideological preferences of
the few wealthy donors on which it would depend.
Part I of the Article presents the Rehnquist Court’s approach to campaign finance law and the anticorruption interest. It explains how the Rehnquist Court failed to develop a
8
See infra subpart III.C; see also KENNETH P. VOGEL, BIG MONEY: 2.5 BILLION
DOLLARS, ONE SUSPICIOUS VEHICLE, AND A PIMP—ON THE TRAIL OF THE ULTRA-RICH
HIJACKING AMERICAN POLITICS 181 (2014) (noting that the 2012 elections were the
first in which outside groups spent more, $2.5 billion, than the major parties, at
$1.6 billion combined).
9
See Kang, supra note 7, at 55 (“Deregulation of contributions to candidates
and parties might make them relatively more attractive to political sponsors, who
thus might contribute directly rather than underwrite independent expenditures
by outside groups.”).
10
See infra subpart II.B.
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richer conception of quid pro quo corruption, relying on alternate theories of corruption to uphold campaign finance regulation. This failure became a vulnerability that the Roberts Court
has exploited in rolling back much of the Rehnquist Court’s
campaign finance jurisprudence. Part II introduces the path
not taken by the Rehnquist Court—a group-level theory of quid
pro quo corruption that provides a constitutional basis for government regulation of modern party campaign finance. Part III
then applies this group-level theory of corruption to three controversies over party campaign finance: pay-to-play laws, party
soft money, and party-sponsored Super PACs. Finally, Part IV
describes, assesses, and challenges the normative case for deregulating party campaign finance. It criticizes the case for deregulation as too focused on the balance of power among elite
political actors and neglectful of the distributional inequalities
of the current campaign finance system.
I
THE CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW OF THE REHNQUIST COURT,
AND THEN THE ROBERTS COURT
Buckley v. Valeo11 set the terms for campaign finance law
that endure today, and the first thirty years of campaign finance law under Buckley are largely a story of judicial deference. After sorting out the basic parameters of campaign
finance law, the Court generally upheld a growing body of campaign finance regulation within those broad parameters and
beyond.12 In Buckley itself, the Court decided the constitutionality of the comprehensive system of campaign finance regulation enacted by Congress in its 1974 amendments to FECA.13
The Court ruled that campaign finance actually constituted
First Amendment expression and association, rather than
mere expressive conduct, and therefore applied the First
Amendment to its regulation under FECA. However, the Court
also critically decided that the government held “a sufficiently
important interest” in the prevention of quid pro quo corruption, and the appearance thereof, to support certain forms of
campaign finance regulation against constitutional
challenge.14
Under this framework, the Court upheld FECA’s contribution limits but struck down as unconstitutional FECA’s com11
12
13
14

424 U.S. 1 (1976).
See infra notes 22–25 and accompanying text.
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 1.
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25.

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-3\CRN301.txt

538

unknown

Seq: 8

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

16-MAR-16

15:47

[Vol. 101:531

plementary limits on expenditures. The Court reasoned that
contribution limits imposed “only a marginal restriction upon
the contributor’s ability to engage in free communication”15
and served the anticorruption interest “without directly impinging upon the rights of individual citizens and candidates to
engage in political debate and discussion.”16 Following this
reasoning, the Court upheld the contribution limits as serving
“weighty interests . . . sufficient to justify the limited effect” of
the FECA contribution limits by regulating actual exchanges
with candidates that raise the strongest worry about a quid pro
quo agreement.17
By contrast, the Court applied strict scrutiny to FECA’s
expenditure limits and struck them down. It explained that
expenditure limits “impose significantly more severe restrictions on protected freedoms of political expression and association.”18 Expenditure limits, by directly limiting how much any
speaker can spend on campaign speech, “necessarily reduces
the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues
discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the
audience reached.”19 What is more, expenditure limits restrict
independent expenditures that, as the Court saw it at the time,
do not present risks of actual or apparent corruption comparable to large contributions. The Court contrasted independent
expenditures from contributions to candidates, in that “[t]he
absence of prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure
with the candidate . . . alleviates the danger that expenditures
will be given as a quid pro quo . . . .”20
This basic framework from Buckley survived almost four
decades of constitutional litigation. The result, at least until
the Roberts Court, was a general policy of judicial deference to
the government in campaign finance law within these broad
parameters.21 For thirty years following Buckley, the Court
upheld every type of contribution limit whose constitutionality
it was asked to adjudicate.22 Not only did the Court uphold
15

Id. at 20–21.
Id. at 58.
17
Id. at 29.
18
Id. at 23.
19
Id. at 19.
20
Id. at 47.
21
Different constitutional rules, however, apply outside of direct democracy.
See First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786–95 (1978) (striking down
a Massachusetts statute prohibiting banks and corporations from campaigning
for or against ballot measures that did not materially impact their business).
22
See Nathaniel Persily, Fig Leaves and Tea Leaves in the Supreme Court’s
Recent Election Law Decisions, 2008 SUP. CT. REV. 89, 109–10 (“From Buckley v
16
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contribution limits, it specified that a contribution limit could
be unconstitutionally too low only if it “was so radical in effect
as to render political association ineffective, drive the sound of
a candidate’s voice below the level of notice, and render contributions pointless.”23 Likewise, the Court routinely upheld different forms of campaign finance disclosure under Buckley’s
robust endorsement of disclosure as means for combating corruption and informing voters.24 Of course, the Court also
struck down expenditure limits so consistently under Buckley
that campaign finance reformers ceased legislating them in any
straightforward fashion.25
Although Buckley has survived for decades, few decisions
have been subject to greater pressure.26 Buckley’s identification of anticorruption as the prerequisite government interest
for campaign finance regulation has received particular pressure.27 The constitutional focus on anticorruption has channeled legal justifications for campaign finance regulation even
while much of the political impetus for campaign finance regulation is driven by equality considerations.28 As a practical
matter, it is no secret that campaign finance reform is motivated in important part by worries about the translation of
economic inequality into political inequality.29 For those concerned about money’s influence in politics, the legal restriction
of money in the electoral process checks the disproportionate
influence of the wealthy and reinforces democratic norms of
political equality.30 But Buckley expressly rejected a governValeo until Randall v Sorrell, contribution limits appeared almost untouchable by
the Supreme Court.” (footnotes omitted)); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Introduction to
Symposium: Law of Democracy, 18 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 234, 236 (2007) (noting
that Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006), represented the first time that the
Court struck down a contribution limit as too low to survive First Amendment
challenge).
23
Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 397 (2000).
24
See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66–68.
25
See Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 237–39 (2006).
26
See Samuel Issacharoff, Market Intermediaries in the Post-Buckley World,
89 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 105, 105 (2014) (remarking that “Buckley v. Valeo is
extraordinarily stable for such an unpopular decision” (footnotes omitted)).
27
See id. at 108–09.
28
See Strauss, infra note 29.
29
See David A. Strauss, Corruption, Equality, and Campaign Finance Reform,
94 COLUM. L. REV. 1369, 1371–80 (1994) (identifying equality as the motivating
interest for campaign finance reform).
30
See Richard Briffault, On Dejudicializing American Campaign Finance Law,
27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 887, 914 (2011) (“Political equality is undermined when some
individuals or interest groups with greater private wealth than others can draw on
those resources to make more extensive appeals to the electorate than can those
with fewer resources.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Political Equality and Unintended Circumstances, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1390, 1392 (1994) (endorsing a campaign finance

R
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ment interest in “equalizing the relative ability of individuals
and groups to influence the outcome of elections,” another
principle from Buckley that has endured since.31 There is thus
a fundamental tension between an important part of the democratic justifications for campaign finance regulation and the
legal justifications necessary to defend it against constitutional
attack in court.
During the Rehnquist Court, this tension mediated a
steady expansion of what campaign finance regulation was permissible under the anticorruption interest. Once the campaign
finance landscape settled after Buckley, the Rehnquist Court
generally upheld regulation under various elaborations on the
core government interest in the prevention of quid pro quo
corruption.32 The clearest example of the Court striving to reconcile equality concerns with the anticorruption interest was
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce.33 There, the Court
upheld a Michigan prohibition on corporate expenditures,
modeled after the analogous FECA provision, by affirming the
government’s interest in preventing “a different type of corruption in the political arena” than the usual quid pro quo discussed in Buckley.34 The Court explained that the state law in
Austin checked the “corrosive and distorting effects of immense
aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of
the corporate form.”35 In other words, the Court upheld the
law based on its effect of leveling out wealth disparities, abetted
by the advantages of incorporation, that potentially diverge
from the actual distribution of public opinion in the citizenry.36
This interpretation of the government’s anticorruption interest
departed markedly from the core Buckley concern about quid
pro quo exchanges and swung obviously toward equality con-

interest in preventing the wealthy from “translat[ing] their wealth into political
influence”).
31
424 U.S. 1, 48 (1976).
32
See Richard L. Hasen, Rethinking the Unconstitutionality of Contribution
and Expenditure Limits in Ballot Measure Campaigns, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 885,
887–90 (2005) (describing the Rehnquist Court’s deference to government in campaign finance).
33
494 U.S. 652, 658–59 (1990).
34
Id. at 659–60.
35
Id.
36
See Elizabeth Garrett, New Voices in Politics: Justice Marshall’s Jurisprudence on Law and Politics, 52 HOW. L.J. 655, 670–78 (2009) (disclosing as Justice
Thurgood Marshall’s clerk during the Austin Term that his opinion articulated a
government interest in campaign finance equalization but needed to disguise
itself as a matter of anticorruption to command a Court majority).
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cerns the Court had rejected earlier when presented with them
more forthrightly in Buckley and Bellotti.37
The Court embraced another extension of anticorruption in
McConnell v. FEC to uphold federal prohibitions on party soft
money.38 Beginning in the 1980s, the national parties exploited a nuance in federal campaign finance regulation under
which they could collect unlimited money from virtually any
domestic source provided they spent it on so-called partybuilding and issue advocacy rather than express electioneering.39 The parties’ unrestricted collection of this soft money
surged to the point that it constituted almost half the total
money they collected in 2000.40 In response, Congress enacted
a federal ban that prohibited the national party committees
from receiving and spending this soft money, requiring instead
that all donations to the national party committees comply with
federal restrictions previously applicable only to so-called hard
money spent on express advocacy and campaigning.41
The Court upheld the soft money ban by relying heavily on
the notion that the anticorruption interest encompassed the
prevention of undue influence. The Court explained that “Congress’ legitimate interest extends beyond preventing simple
cash-for-votes corruption to curbing ‘undue influence on an
officeholder’s judgment, and the appearance of such influence.’”42 Although the McConnell plaintiffs argued that the
government did not prove a single instance of an actual quid
pro quo in the record, the Court dismissed a narrow focus on
quid pro quo exchanges as a “crabbed view of corruption.”43
Instead, the government was constitutionally entitled to address “more subtle but equally dispiriting forms of corruption”
in “the danger that officeholders will decide issues not on the
merits or the desires of their constituencies, but according to
the wishes of those who have made large financial contributions.”44 The danger of undue influence justified the restriction
of soft money to the national parties, who themselves had sold
access to party officeholders for soft money contributions.
37
See id. (observing that Justice Marshall, author of Austin, was primarily
motivated by equality concerns in the decision).
38
540 U.S. 93, 161 (2003).
39
See Richard Briffault, Soft Money Reform and the Constitution, 1 ELECTION
L.J. 343, 345 (2002).
40
See id. at 347.
41
See id. at 343.
42
McConnell, 540 U.S. at 150 (quoting FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 441 (2001)).
43
Id. at 152.
44
Id. at 153.
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By these turns, the Court elided the potential restrictiveness of the quid pro quo framework. The Rehnquist Court
ostensibly held its ground on the exclusivity of the anticorruption interest as predicate to campaign finance regulation. It
turned away explicit appeals to equality as constitutionally permissible interests for the government to pursue through regulation.45 However, a Rehnquist Court basically sympathetic to
the post-Buckley state of campaign finance reform stretched
the anticorruption framework to permit regulation in a number
of decisions where the fit was not intuitive. The Court expanded what the interest encompassed not only to distortion in
Austin and undue influence in McConnell, but repeatedly in
other key decisions as well.46 The Court placed more emphasis
on the government’s interest in the prevention of not just actual corruption but its appearance.47 And in the government’s
empirical substantiation of worries about the appearance of
corruption, the Court applied a deferential standard to the proposition that restrictions on contributions help address
them.48 What is more, the Court earlier upheld contribution
limits on donations even to nonconnected PACs that themselves could not engage directly in quid pro quo exchanges with
their contributors.49
The consequence of the Court’s flexibility was that there
was less need to press the outer limits of what the anticorruption interest might logically accommodate even when focused
narrowly on quid pro quo exchanges. In other words, the government successfully defended regulation by convincing the
Rehnquist Court to expand the definition of anticorruption beyond the core target of quid pro quo exchanges to encompass
broader conceptions of corruption such as undue influence,
distortion, and the appearance of corruption. This success
made it less imperative for reformers to convince the Court to

45
See id. at 226–29 (dismissing challenges to The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002’s (BCRA) indexed contribution limits as grounded in impermissible equality concerns).
46
See infra notes 47–48.
47
See, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 388–89 (2000)
(noting that the prevention of the appearance of corruption is a “constitutionally
sufficient justification”).
48
See, e.g., FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 155 (2003) (reasoning that
deference to legislative choice is appropriate when Congress regulates campaign
contributions); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 144–53 (summarizing the Court’s empirical concerns about corruption); Nixon, 528 U.S. at 391–93 (noting that empirical
evidence establishes the plausibility of corruption).
49
See Cal. Med. Ass’n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 195 (1981).
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broaden what could be regulated strictly in the prevention of
quid pro quo exchanges.
Of course, some of the campaign finance regulation upheld
by the Rehnquist Court could not have been justified as furthering the prevention of quid pro quo exchanges. The Court’s
decision in Austin offers a good example.50 The decision upheld a prohibition on corporate expenditures that were, by legal
definition, independent of formal coordination or prearrangement with candidates.51 In the absence of a formal nexus between candidate and the expenditure, the case law held that
the risk of a quid pro quo is minimized, at least compared to the
risk presented by a formal contribution that the candidate directly receives him or herself.52 That said, it is entirely plausible as a realistic matter that expenditures present a risk of quid
pro quo. Even nominally independent expenditures can be
monitored and effectively reciprocated by candidates who understand what might be expected or appreciated by those footing the bill, regardless of the explicitness in the exchange.53
Nonetheless, the Court’s well-established skepticism about the
quid pro quo risk presented by independent expenditures
largely preempted the government from winning in Austin by
arguing along those lines.54
However, there were other important cases the Court decided on grounds beyond the quid pro quo framework but
might have fit more narrowly within it.55 The campaign finance
regulation of the major parties, as I argue in the next Part,
might have been justified in terms of the prevention of quid pro
quo exchanges, at least of a particular sort. In this sense,
campaign finance law did not exhaust the logical limits of what
the government arguably could regulate within the quid pro
quo framework. Ironically, this might have occurred not because the Rehnquist Court was skeptical about the limits, but
precisely because its receptivity to more expansive approaches
50

Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 667–68 (1990).
Id.
52
See Garrett, supra note 36, at 671–73 (explaining the doctrinal challenge in
extending the government’s anticorruption interest to corporate independent expenditures given Buckley’s reasoning that independent expenditures raised little
corruption risk).
53
See Daniel R. Ortiz, The Unbearable Lightness of Being McConnell, 3 ELECTION L.J. 299, 301 (2004) (“[T]here is no reason to believe that a candidate would
feel much less beholden to someone who has expended sums on her behalf than
to someone who has given her money directly.”).
54
See 494 U.S. at 659–60.
55
See infra text accompanying note 57.
51
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obviated the need to exhaust those limits to justify existing
regulation.
Consider for example the Rehnquist Court’s approach to
party soft money in McConnell. On the one hand, the potential
risk of corruption from soft money contributions to political
parties might seem too obvious to deny. The major parties
nominate, support, and coordinate their candidates under
common party labels that effectively organize the American political landscape.56 The major parties, as the Court has acknowledged, enjoy a “special relationship and unity of interest”
with their candidates and officeholders.57 Campaign contributions received by the party committees will be spent in support
of their party candidates, who stand to benefit and know the
party’s contributors. For exactly this reason, the national
party committees and their officeholders collaborated extensively to raise nearly a billion dollars in combined soft money
during a presidential election cycle shortly before the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) prohibited it.58 In
exchange for soft money donations, the national party committees sold donors special access to their officeholders and literally offered menus listing prices for different levels of access.59
This outright sale of access, along with extensive evidence of
soft money earmarking for specific candidates and of officeholder involvement with soft money fundraising, led the
Rehnquist Court to conclude that soft money contributions
were likely to create actual or apparent indebtedness for federal
officeholders, regardless how soft money was restricted in
use.60
Still, the technical application of the Court’s quid pro quo
framework to contributions received by a political party, as
opposed to candidates and officeholders themselves, was
hardly straightforward. Contributions received by candidates
and officeholders could be most clearly characterized as a potential basis for quid pro quo exchange, but the soft money
ban, as Justice Kennedy noted in dissent, “d[id] not regulate
federal candidates’ or officeholders’ receipt of quids because it
56
See Richard Briffault, Political Parties and Campaign Finance Reform, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 620, 639 (2000) (“The candidate is typically a member of the party,
has been active in the party, and, once nominated, bears the party label, uses the
party’s place on the ballot, and necessarily benefits from the loyalty and support
of party activists.”).
57
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 145 (2003).
58
Id. at 145–48.
59
Id. at 150–51.
60
Id. at 155.
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d[id] not regulate contributions to, or conduct by, candidates or
officeholders.”61 The national party committees received the
soft money gifts as a formal matter, regardless whether they
ultimately benefitted candidates and officeholders. And as a
further technical point, the party committees did not hold public office or have direct access to government authority that it
can trade in prohibited quid pro quo exchanges with contributors.62 Even if the party committees were intimately intertwined with their candidates and officeholders, and
collaborated with them to raise soft money for their express
benefit, and sold special access to them as the primary means
of inducing donors to contribute, the party committees were
the official recipients of the soft money, not the candidates and
officeholders.
Under the myopic framework of quid pro quo corruption,
the party committees thus insulated their candidates and officeholders from soft money exchanges with donors. The party
committees themselves had never been understood, as a matter of campaign finance law, to be legally capable of engaging in
the type of quid pro quo exchanges that triggered the government’s anticorruption interest. No matter how intuitive the
case for regulating soft money campaign finance, the Court’s
simplistic conception of quid pro quo corruption only between
individual officeholder and contributor complicated the constitutional justification for the BCRA soft money ban.
For all these reasons, the Court felt compelled to uphold
regulation of soft money on constitutional bases beyond the
prevention of quid pro quo corruption. In McConnell, the Court
explained that “Congress’ legitimate interest extends beyond
preventing simple cash-for-votes corruption to curbing ‘undue
influence on an officeholder’s judgment.’”63 Rather than extend quid pro quo corruption to cover the intuitive case against
soft money, the Court instead applied its novel theory of undue
influence to uphold the federal prohibition. The Court extended the government’s regulatory interest to “the danger that
officeholders will decide issues not on the merits or the desires
of their constituencies, but according to the wishes of those
who have made large financial contributions valued by the officeholder.”64 So stated, the Court defined the prevention of
61

Id. at 299 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
See Issacharoff, supra note 26, at 110–11 (“Parties do not govern and are
poor vehicles for direct quid-pro-quo corruption.”).
63
McConnell, 540 U.S. at 150 (quoting FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 441 (2001)).
64
Id. at 153.
62
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undue influence by the potential for subjective obligation or
indebtedness because restricting campaign finance regulation
to “straight cash-for-votes transactions” would “render Congress powerless to address more subtle but equally dispiriting
forms of corruption.”65 This flexible approach broke from the
core conception of quid pro quo corruption at the heart of
Buckley.66
In this way, the Rehnquist Court upheld campaign finance
regulation, such as the soft money ban, by introducing new
constitutional grounds for government intervention, rather
than elaborating the basic conception of quid pro quo corruption and exploring analytical extensions. The evolution of campaign finance law followed a kind of path dependence once it
departed from quid pro quo exchanges as a nonexclusive core
harm. When constitutional challenges presented a complicated fit with that core harm, the Rehnquist Court permitted
itself to adopt ancillary doctrine more removed from that core
harm than might have been doctrinally necessary.
This approach by the Rehnquist Court became a liability
under the Roberts Court. Once Chief Justice John Roberts and
Justice Samuel Alito replaced Chief Justice William Rehnquist
and Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, the Court abruptly
switched course on campaign finance law. Consistent government deference under Chief Justice Rehnquist shifted to systematic dismantling of the FECA campaign finance regime
under Chief Justice Roberts. The replacement of two Republican appointees for another two resulted in a transformation of
campaign finance law as the Court invalidated campaign finance regulation in a long series of decisions.67 Justice
Kennedy’s earlier dissents in cases like McConnell and Austin
articulated his disagreement with the Rehnquist Court’s willingness to stray from quid pro quo corruption as its lodestar for

65

Id.
See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26–27 (1976).
67
See generally McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1462 (2014) (striking
down the federal aggregate contribution limit); Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom
Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2829–30 (2011) (striking down Arizona’s
public campaign financing system); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 372
(2010) (striking down the federal prohibition on corporate expenditures and electioneering); Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 744–45 (2008) (striking down the Millionaire’s Amendment); FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 481–82 (2007)
(invalidating the application of the federal prohibition on corporate electioneering
as applied to issue advocacy that was not unmistakably the functional equivalent
of express advocacy); Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 261–63 (2006) (striking
down Vermont’s contribution and expenditure limits).
66
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questions of campaign finance law.68 His “crabbed view of corruption” from those dissenting opinions on the Rehnquist
Court ascended from the minority to leading a cohesive fivejustice majority on campaign finance law.69
In Citizens United v. FEC,70 Justice Kennedy’s majority
opinion made absolutely clear that the Roberts Court is focusing more narrowly than ever on quid pro quo corruption to
bound the government’s interest in campaign finance regulation. Citizens United overruled Austin and struck down federal
prohibitions on corporate independent expenditures and electioneering under the First Amendment.71 Justice Kennedy’s
majority opinion explained that Buckley limited the government’s anticorruption interest to only the prevention of quid
pro quo corruption.72 So defined, Justice Kennedy reasoned
that independent expenditures could not be restricted, regardless of their corporate source.73 Independent expenditures, by
definition, do not involve a financial exchange with a candidate
or officeholder, nor involve prearrangement or coordination
with candidates or officeholders. Because quid pro quo corruption is defined by an exchange of quids with a candidate or
officeholder, Justice Kennedy clarified without qualification
that “independent expenditures, including those made by corporations, do not give rise to corruption or the appearance of
corruption.”74
As for alternative theories of corruption from McConnell
and Austin as bases for regulating corporate electioneering,
Citizens United flatly overruled them as obviously inconsistent
with the defining corruption harm of quid pro quo. Addressing
McConnell, Justice Kennedy explained that “[i]ngratiation and
access . . . are not corruption.”75 Quoting his own dissent in
McConnell, he insisted that “[r]eliance on a ‘generic favoritism
or influence theory . . . is at odds with standard First Amendment analyses because it is unbounded and susceptible to no
limiting principle.’”76 Addressing Austin, Justice Kennedy likewise dismissed the Rehnquist Court’s antidistortion approach,
68

See infra notes 204–208 and accompanying text.
McConnell, 540 U.S. at 152.
70
558 U.S. 310 (2010).
71
See id. at 362–68.
72
See id. at 359.
73
See id. at 360.
74
Id. at 357.
75
Id. at 360.
76
Id. at 359 (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 296 (2003) (Kennedy,
J., dissenting)).
69
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identifying “a different type of corruption” grounded in equality,77 as detached from the quid pro quo framework and “not
well reasoned.”78
The Rehnquist Court’s approach in splintering off alternative theories of corruption made it easier for the Roberts Court
to quickly transform the campaign finance system just by restoring the tight focus of the government’s regulatory interest
to quid pro quo corruption. The Roberts Court’s embrace of
Justice Kennedy’s narrow framing of the anticorruption interest was therefore tidy and parsimonious, faithfully returning to
Buckley’s core concern uncomplicated by misguided diversions
from the straightforward quid pro quo.79 In the brave new
world of campaign finance law, the Roberts Court was spared
the necessity of slowly unraveling bit by bit what might have
been a denser, richer conception of quid pro quo corruption,
one that might have achieved the same results within the quid
pro quo framework. Put aside the question whether a greater
jurisprudential challenge for Justice Kennedy and the Roberts
Court would have been a net good or bad. The point is that the
Rehnquist Court’s approach was ironically encouraged by the
Rehnquist Court’s sympathy for campaign finance reform, perhaps quite avoidably. In the following Part, I offer an example
of the jurisprudential path not taken in this regard—a doctrinal approach working within the quid pro quo framework but
capacious enough to support a wider range of campaign finance regulation than the current understanding of quid pro
quo corruption seems to allow.
II
PARTY CAMPAIGN FINANCE AND A THEORY OF GROUPLEVEL CORRUPTION
In this Part, I offer a new approach to corruption that remains faithful to the basic conception of the quid pro quo exchange as its defining harm, but allows pragmatic flexibility to
accommodate realistic sensibilities about a campaign finance
system where officeholders and candidates are thoroughly interconnected by their party relationships. The traditional notion of quid pro quo corruption has been unrealistically
restricted to a dyadic framework in which concerns about
77

Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990).
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 363.
79
See Bradley A. Smith, McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission: An
Unlikely Blockbuster, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 48, 57 (2015) (“Thirty-five years of
chipping away at this standard was washed away.”).
78
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money in politics are limited to individual contributors and
individual officeholders pairing off in isolation from the rest of
their political world. Instead, the major parties pervade both
American campaign finance and policymaking. Parties entwine
donors, candidates, and officeholders in cohesive networks
that raise plausible corruption worries about party-related
campaign finance. Even though this approach to party campaign finance is unlikely to be adopted by the Roberts Court, it
sets an intellectual foundation for a future Court less hostile to
campaign finance regulation, much as Justice Kennedy’s dissents from the Rehnquist Court set the foundation for the
Roberts Court’s subsequent reversal.
A. The Corruption Risk in Party Campaign Finance
Political corruption can be played as a team sport. In fact,
corruption at its finest was historically played as a team sport
in the form of party machine politics. The old-fashioned party
machines constituted enormous teams of city politicians, organizers, and constituents who cooperated in a complicated
economy of patronage, votes, and money that dominated politics for decades.80 In the classic formulation, the party machine
stayed in power by exchanging government benefits and patronage for the labor of party loyalists.81 The party bosses and
loyalists together ran a well-oiled operation for providing government benefits (of various sorts) to pay for the electoral campaigns and community subsidies necessary to get out the vote
and win elections.82 The party machine was an ongoing team
effort, cemented by party loyalty and mutual benefit.
Our modern major parties operate quite differently today
than the archetypal party machine. The outright graft, reliance
on patronage, and basic malfeasance of the traditional party
80
See generally JOHN M. ALLSWANG, BOSSES, MACHINES, AND URBAN VOTERS: AN
AMERICAN SYMBIOSIS 3–35 (1977) (providing an overview of political machine politics); STEVEN P. ERIE, RAINBOW’S END: IRISH-AMERICANS AND THE DILEMMAS OF URBAN
MACHINE POLITICS, 1840–1985, at 1–23 (1988) (providing the same).
81
See James Q. Wilson, The Economy of Patronage, 69 J. POL. ECON. 369,
372–79 (1961) (articulating this basic exchange theory of machine politics); see
also ALLSWANG, supra note 80, at 150–51 (using Chicago as an example of the
importance of government employment to the voter base); ERIE, supra note 80, at
86–91 (describing the machine economy of patronage jobs and votes); TERRY
GOLWAY, MACHINE MADE: TAMMANY HALL AND THE CREATION OF MODERN AMERICAN
POLITICS 154–56 (2014) (outlining the transactional nature of machine politics).
82
See, e.g., ALLSWANG, supra note 80, at 73–77; ERIE, supra note 80, at 86–89
(describing the parties’ patronage of the private sector); see generally VIRGIL W.
PETERSON, BARBARIANS IN OUR MIDST: A HISTORY OF CHICAGO CRIME AND POLITICS
155–76 (1952) (describing Chicago machine collaboration with organized crime).
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machine, as practiced by Tammany Hall and others, are greatly
diminished even in urban politics from their heyday.83 Civil
service reform, campaign finance regulation, and television,
among many other things, have altered how politicians get
elected, win the loyalty of activists, and collect the necessary
campaign resources to win office. A series of political reforms
covering virtually all elements of politics, coupled with the overarching shift of parties from vehicles of mass mobilization to
vehicles for modern technological campaigning, have radically
changed how money is raised and used in politics.84 But what
has not changed is the importance of money in politics. Today’s politics still demand large-scale campaign finance to fund
the expensive apparatus of modern campaigning in a hypercompetitive and partisan political environment.85 While the
most egregious forms of money-related corruption are less present today than ever before, as many have observed,86 American politics are dogged by the nagging sense that campaign
money may be more important than ever, with concomitant
concerns about its potential for corruption.
The major parties have always offered crucial advantages
of coordination and teamwork in American politics. Each major party consolidates a sprawling political coalition, internally
allied by common political and ideological goals, under a
shared public label that signals their overlapping intentions
and interests. Each party comprises officeholders and candidates for office who see common interest in working together to
achieve certain shared electoral and policymaking goals. Their
affiliation and nomination under the party label signals a will83
See generally OLIVER E. ALLEN, THE TIGER: THE RISE AND FALL OF TAMMANY
HALL 260–83 (1993) (detailing the fall of the Tammany Hall machine in New York);
GOLWAY, supra note 81, at 286–308 (detailing the same).
84
See MARTIN SHEFTER, POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE STATE: THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE 86–94 (1994) (cataloguing the structural changes in the party
system starting in the 1960s); Kay Lawson, How State Laws Undermine Parties, in
ELECTIONS AMERICAN STYLE 240, 251 (A. James Reichley ed., 1987) (examining the
effect of state laws on campaign finance).
85
See, e.g., Russ Choma, Final Tally: 2014’s Midterm Was Most Expensive,
with Fewer Donors, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS (Feb. 18, 2015), https://
www.opensecrets.org/news/2015/02/final-tally-2014s-midterm-was-most-ex
pensive-with-fewer-donors/ [http://perma.cc/9J3W-AZRT] (describing the escalating cost of campaign financing).
86
See WILLIAM J. BENNETT, THE DEATH OF OUTRAGE: BILL CLINTON AND THE ASSAULT ON AMERICAN IDEALS 71 (1998) (“[I]n general, politics today is less corrupt
than perhaps at any point in American history.”); JOHN STEELE GORDON, HAMILTON’S
BLESSING 183 (2010) (“[O]ur politics are cleaner today than they have ever been
before . . . .”); Norman J. Ornstein, Doing Congress’s Dirty Work, 86 GEO. L.J.
2179, 2180 (1998) (noting the belief that “politics today is much cleaner, maybe
cleaner than ever”).
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ingness to cooperate and find mutual advantage in the party’s
collective success. What is more, the party label coordinates
supporters who wish to advance the party’s shared goals by
supplying the party’s officeholders and candidates with votes
and resources,87 including campaign contributions. The party
maintains this permanent apparatus of professional expertise,
volunteer labor, campaign financing, and voters that pervades
every level of American politics and dominates electoral competition for federal, state, and local office in every state.88 The
party apparatus helps its candidates to gain public office,
where they are expected to coordinate their efforts to achieve
the party’s policymaking goals.
During the early to middle Twentieth Century, the party
apparatus’s support of its officeholders and candidates came
perhaps most importantly in the form of volunteer support and
guaranteed blocs of votes, often secured by patronage.89 Electoral politics during this period were strongly party centered,
locally governed, and profoundly hierarchical, ruled by party
bosses who decided party affairs such as nominations in proverbial smoke-filled rooms.90 Parties commanded voter loyalties through their familiar party label that signaled their policy
commitments and through the promise of material support.91
87
See Pamela Johnston Conover & Stanley Feldman, Candidate Perception in
an Ambiguous World: Campaigns, Cues, and Inference Processes, 33 AM. J. POL.
SCI. 912, 916 (1989) (describing how voters infer from party affiliation).
88
See generally PETER L. FRANCIA ET AL., THE FINANCIERS OF CONGRESSIONAL
ELECTIONS: INVESTORS, IDEOLOGUES, AND INTIMATES 69–98 (2003) (describing the
campaign donation solicitation process); PAUL S. HERRNSON, CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS: CAMPAIGNING AT HOME AND IN WASHINGTON 7–39 (6th ed. 2012); SETH E. MASKET, NO MIDDLE GROUND: HOW INFORMAL PARTY ORGANIZATIONS CONTROL NOMINATIONS
AND POLARIZE LEGISLATURES 1–22 (2009) (using California as a case study of the
influence exerted by local party organizations).
89
See JOHN H. ALDRICH, WHY PARTIES?: THE ORIGIN AND TRANSFORMATION OF
POLITICAL PARTIES IN AMERICA 180–86 (1995) (describing the involvement of amateur
activists in elections); RONALD J. HREBENAR ET AL., POLITICAL PARTIES, INTEREST
GROUPS, AND POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS 175 (1999) (describing the mobilization efforts of
national and local party organizations); SHEFTER, supra note 84, at 82 (noting the
advent of mass-mobilization efforts during the New Deal era).
90
Joseph Fishkin & Heather K. Gerken, The Party’s Over: McCutcheon,
Shadow Parties, and the Future of the Party System, 2014 SUP. CT. REV. 175, 185;
see Scott C. James, Patronage Regimes and American Party Development from
‘The Age of Jackson’ to the Progressive Era, 36 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 39, 48–50 (2005)
(comparing the parties’ organization to a machine); Richard Jensen, The Last
Party System: Decay of Consensus 1932–1980, in THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN
ELECTORAL SYSTEMS 203, 210–11 (1981) (noting the expansion of parties’ influence
from local to state and national elections).
91
See generally ALDRICH, supra note 89, at 266–69 (explaining the demise of
the mass modern party); WALTER DEAN BURNHAM, CRITICAL ELECTIONS AND THE MAINSPRINGS OF AMERICAN POLITICS 95–96 (1970) (distinguishing “militarist” party politics from modern “mercantilist” politics); SHEFTER, supra note 84, at 36–60
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Party candidates thus relied heavily on the parties to elevate
their candidacies through the party’s endorsement and nomination. Candidates had little direct access to voters other than
labor-intensive, face-to-face politics at the retail level. Only the
major parties could mobilize large numbers of supporters and
voters through their standing infrastructure during this age
before mass media technology. The party was the star, not the
candidates. Candidates earned their party support through
consistent loyalty and service within party hierarchies controlled by party bosses.92
Television and radio advertising rapidly destabilized this
state of party politics starting in the 1960s.93 Television and
radio advertising allowed candidates the potential to communicate directly with the electorate, with or without the party’s
endorsement. It provided a channel for communication with
voters, who might respond to a candidate’s personal and political charms even if the candidate had not earned his or her way
up the party hierarchy.94 The opportunity to bypass the party
hierarchy grew larger and larger as television and radio advertising reached an increasing number of voters and the reach of
new technology spread through the American public. What is
more, corresponding changes to the party nomination systems
from boss-dominated caucuses to direct primary election fed
the growing importance of reaching voters directly through television by the 1980s.95 Political scientists observing these
trends lamented the decline of American political parties as the
rise of candidate-centered politics replaced the party-centered
politics of yore.96
Worry about the decline of American parties, of course, was
premature. The major parties, as they have consistently
throughout our history, adapted to the changed circumstances
(comparing party organizations’ practices in European countries and the United
States).
92
See THOMAS COLLIER PLATT, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THOMAS COLLIER PLATT
501–03 (Louis J. Lang ed., 1910) (“A political organization should be conducted
upon the simplest principles of business. Merit and devotion should be rewarded.
Demerit and treachery should be condemned and examples made of those guilty
of them.”).
93
See ALDRICH, supra note 89, at 252–53 (describing the introduction of television and the corresponding shift to candidate-centered, media politics).
94
See HREBENAR, supra note 89, at 176.
95
See id. at 175–76 (describing the effects of moving to direct primary elections); Austin Ranney, The Political Parties: Reform and Decline, in THE NEW AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM, 213, 243–47 (Anthony King ed., 1978) (explaining how
television changed the relationship between voters and candidates).
96
See, e.g., WILLIAM J. CROTTY & GARY C. JACOBSON, AMERICAN PARTIES IN DECLINE 3 (1980) (depicting the perceived deterioration of the major parties).
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of American electoral politics. Parties have always offered as a
critical resource to officeholders and candidates the capacity to
coordinate immense numbers of politicians, activists, and voters over the long term as part of a standing infrastructure. The
shape and form of the party infrastructure has changed many
times as they adapted to modern circumstance, but the promise of coordination is always the same.97 The modern circumstances of the television age required the currency of campaign
money. Campaign finance was not central in the militarist,
patronage-oriented party politics of a century ago because candidates mobilized voters to their side through their parties’
grassroots operations.98 However, in the television age, voters
increasingly evaluated candidates through television. This development increasingly required candidates, whether backed
by the party or not, to buy expensive television advertising for
the necessary name recognition and positive reputation to win
office.99 This growing need for campaign money to buy the
necessary television advertising created a correspondingly new
role for the parties to play.100
The parties became very good at building an infrastructure
for the collection and disbursement of campaign money in support of their officeholders and candidates.101 The traditional
parties of the earlier age of party-centered politics maintained a
vast infrastructure of party volunteers and voters that they
could mobilize quickly in support of their favored candidates.
The modern parties of the television age instead cultivated a
campaign finance infrastructure of professional fundraisers,
loyal donors willing to fund the parties’ candidates, and a system of recruiting and equipping those candidates with the nec97
See Morris P. Fiorina, Parties and Partisanship: A 40-Year Retrospective, 24
POL. BEHAV. 93, 103 (2002) (describing Aldrich’s conceptualization of parties as
malleable institutions that politicians “invent and reinvent to solve problems that
face them at particular times in history”).
98
See BURNHAM, supra note 91, at 95-97 (describing “militarist” party mobilization and the shift to a “mercantilist” party system); Daniel M. Shea, The Passing
of Realignment and the Advent of the “Base-less” Party System, 27 AM. POL. Q. 33,
48 (1999) (“Money has always been important, but prior to party ‘adaptation,’
many activities were labor-intensive—such as door-to-door canvassing and literature drops.”).
99
Ranney, supra note 95, at 243–44.
100
See id. at 245–47 (examining parties’ adaption to changing campaign practices through the 1970s).
101
See Daniel J. Galvin, The Transformation of Political Institutions: Investments in Institutional Resources and Gradual Change in the National Party Committees, 26 AM. POL. DEV. 50, 57–69 (2012) (tracing this development in both the
Republican National Committee and the Democratic National Committee).
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essary expertise for television politics.102 The major parties
became, as political science has well documented, mainly parties in service of candidates.103 Today’s parties now constitute
a permanent “money-centered, technical” support system that
links up campaign finance donors committed to the party
cause with matching candidates likewise committed to the
same goals.104
Parties coordinate their officeholders and candidates, not
only on the campaign side of financing and elections, but also
on the policy side of legislative politics. Just as they always
have, parties coordinate politicians once they are in office in
their policymaking activity. Although politicians of the same
party do not agree on every policy decision, they agree sufficiently to find common interest in coordinating support and
opposition to different policies such that they believe they each
come out ahead over the long run.105 Of course, politicians
have individual incentives to defect in specific cases where defying the party position would yield a discrete personal gain.106
But the risk of losing party support, both in terms of electoral
help and legislative cooperation later on, serves to discipline
the party’s politicians to toe the party line. Parties therefore

102
See Gregory Koger et al., Partisan Webs: Information Exchange and Party
Networks, 39 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 633, 636 (2009) (analyzing cooperative networking
among party candidates, advocacy groups, and donors); MASKET, supra note 88, at
43–53 (describing the close interactions of these actors); see generally FRANCIA ET
AL., supra note 88, at 73–99 (describing the parties’ campaign finance infrastructure); Raymond J. La Raja, State Parties and Soft Money: How Much Party Building?, in THE STATE OF THE PARTIES 132, 136–46 (John C. Green & Rick Farmer eds.,
4th ed. 2003) (detailing party campaign finance operations).
103
See ALDRICH, supra note 89, at 260–74 (explaining the shift from mass
parties to parties in service of candidates); Joseph A. Schlesinger, The New American Political Party, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1152, 1163–64 (1985) (“The high cost of
campaigning today has made money gathering a central task for all political
organizations.”); Shea, supra note 98, at 41–44 (noting the “shift from community-based organizations to national, ‘service-oriented’ units”).
104
See Shea, supra note 98, at 56.
105
See ALDRICH, supra note 89, at 33–37.
106
See Randall L. Calvert, Leadership and Its Basis in Problems of Social
Coordination, 13 INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 7, 8–18 (1992) (analyzing this basic problem
of collective action); see also DAVID W. ROHDE, PARTIES AND LEADERS IN THE POSTREFORM HOUSE 93–105 (1991) (discussing collective action historically and explaining 1970s reform to House party rules to address it); Scott Ashworth,
Campaign Finance and Voter Welfare with Entrenched Incumbents, 100 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 55, 66–67 (2006) (exploring candidates’ competing incentives to please
their constituents as opposed to outside supporters); David P. Baron, Electoral
Competition with Informed and Uninformed Voters, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 33, 44–45
(1994) (exploring the same).
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must regularly “persuade, cajole, or coerce fellow party members to vote consistently with the designated party position.”107
Campaign finance is a salient tool for the parties to do this
important work. Parties first identify and recruit quality candidates who might otherwise go underfunded and then provide
them with the necessary financing to be competitive.108 Parties
promise candidates their standing infrastructure to continue
channeling the financial resources of wealthy supporters. Parties generally route their financing to marginal races where
extra funding is necessary and that offer the greatest electoral
payoff.109 But parties also are free to leverage their party campaign finance, either directly from formal party committees or
indirectly from party allied sources, to boost party influence
over their internal direction and own candidates and officeholders. Parties can deploy their campaign financing to reward
officeholders who have loyally advanced the party cause and
withhold financing to discipline officeholders who have bucked
the party in the past. In my own empirical work, coauthor
Joanna Shepherd and I found that parties appear to influence
judicial decision making by partisan judges in party-preferred
ideological directions through party campaign finance.110
The notion that the parties can use the promise of campaign finance support as a carrot, and its withdrawal as a
stick, to discipline their candidates flows naturally from basic
intuitions about campaign finance. The fundamental worry
about quid pro quo corruption is that the donor of campaign
finance money can exchange it, explicitly or implicitly, for gov107

KEITH KREHBIEL, PIVOTAL POLITICS: A THEORY OF U.S. LAWMAKING 197 (1998).
See Bruce A. Desmarais et al., The Fates of Challengers in U.S. House
Elections: The Role of Extended Party Networks in Supporting Candidates and
Shaping Electoral Outcomes, 59 AM. J. POL. SCI. 194, 195–96 (2015) (“[P]arties
arise because there are several political actors in pursuit of narrow policy objectives, who will rarely achieve success if they go it alone.”).
109
See David F. Damore & Thomas G. Hansford, The Allocation of Party Controlled Campaign Resources in the House of Representatives, 1989–1996, 52 POL.
RES. Q. 371, 376–80 (1999); Timothy P. Nokken, Ideological Congruence Versus
Electoral Success: Distribution of Party Organization Contributions in Senate Elections, 1990–2000, 31 AM. POL. RES. 3, 15 (2003); Jeffrey M. Stonecash, Working at
the Margins: Campaign Finance and Party Strategy in New York Assembly Elections, 13 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 477, 483 (1988); Jeffrey M. Stonecash & Sara E. Keith,
Maintaining a Political Party: Providing and Withdrawing Party Campaign Funds, 2
PARTY POL. 313, 376–80 (1996).
110
Michael S. Kang & Joanna M. Shepherd, The Partisan Foundations of Judicial Campaign Finance, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239, 1276–81 (2013) [hereinafter Kang
& Shepherd, Partisan Foundation]; Michael S. Kang & Joanna M. Shepherd, The
Partisan Price of Justice: An Empirical Analysis of Campaign Contributions and
Judicial Decisions, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 69, 105–09 (2011).
108
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ernment favors from the candidate in return.111 In the case of
party campaign finance, the party likewise might leverage its
fundraising capacity to pressure its candidates to toe the party
line, even when the candidates’ individual preference might be
to act otherwise.112 What is more, one might expect that the
greater the party’s fundraising capacity, the greater the party’s
leverage over its candidates. Along these lines, parties seem to
have expanded their influence during the 1990s when the legal
capacity to raise unrestricted soft money elevated the party
committees’ importance to candidates who coveted that funding.113 For this reason, some commentators advocate the removal of campaign finance restrictions on parties’ fundraising
capacities expressly to strengthen the parties’ hand.114 If parties gain greater capacity to raise money under reduced campaign finance restrictions, then the parties might have greater
ability to coordinate the legislative agenda of its officeholders,
curb self-interested behavior by maverick members inclined to
buck the party, and reduce what those commentators see as
harmful party polarization that has paralyzed federal
lawmaking.
Party campaign finance is potentially pivotal because parties coordinate not only party fundraising and spending, but
also the policymaking activity of party officeholders. Parties
collectivize the fundraising from wealthy supporters necessary
111
See FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 497
(1985) (“The hallmark of corruption is the financial quid pro quo: dollars for
political favors.”).
112
See Kevin M. Leyden & Stephen A. Borrelli, Party Contributions and Party
Unity: Can Loyalty Be Bought?, 43 W. POL. Q. 343, 349–53 (1990) (finding that the
Democratic Party rewards party loyalty more than the Republican Party); Michael
Barber et al., Party Loyalty and Campaign Contributions 17 (June 21, 2014)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (finding that the majority party
rewards state legislative votes in support of the party with campaign financing).
But see David M. Cantor & Paul S. Herrnson, Party Campaign Activity and Party
Unity in the U.S. House of Representatives, 22 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 393, 402 (1997)
(“Past party unity has no significant effect on the distribution of party assistance
in campaign fundraising, communications, and campaign management.”); Richard A. Clucas, Party Contributions and the Influence of Campaign Committee
Chairs on Roll-Call Voting, 22 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 179, 188–93 (1997) (finding no
evidence that greater party funding makes members more loyal to the party but
that freshman members were somewhat more likely to vote with the chairman of
their party’s campaign fundraising committee).
113
See generally Anthony Corrado, Party Finance in the 2000 Elections: The
Federal Role of Soft Money Financing, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1025, 1030–49 (2002)
(describing the rise of party soft money during the period).
114
See infra Part IV; see also Marc E. Elias & Jonathan S. Berkon, Commentary, After McCutcheon, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 373, 378–79 (2014) (explaining that
McCutcheon has already spawned lawsuits and inquiries into the amount of contributions that political parties can collect).
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to win elections and then link it to the parties’ coordination of
candidates’ policymaking activity once elected to office. It is
the promise that a party will execute on its policymaking
agenda that draws investment from financial contributors who
support that agenda.115 In other words, the party consolidates
both the campaign finance and policymaking activity between
party politicians and party financial contributors. The party
facilitates a fundamental bargain in which the contributors
agree to supply campaign financing and the party politicians
generally commit to advance the party’s shared policy aims.116
Typically we view the coordinating function of parties as
normatively positive. E. E. Schattschneider went so far as to
declare that “modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms
of the parties.”117 Parties derive their central importance by
coordinating activity among a diverse, diffuse set of likeminded
political actors who find mutual advantage in cooperation.
Parties allow a rough, sprawling coalition of candidates, activists, and voters to identify commonality and advance their collective goals. In this spirit, parties enable individual
officeholders to coordinate their policy activity without splitting
their resources or splintering their bloc voting power, even
when intracoalition disagreement threatens to distract them
from their collective agenda. Through this process, parties
simplify politics for the electorate by dividing up candidates
and officeholders into opposing teams with opposing views on a
key set of questions.118 This simplification effectively engages
voters with manageable choices in the face of complexity and
makes democratic accountability possible through elections by
rewarding or punishing parties for their collective action.
Although we generally laud the brokering function that the
parties play, the suspicion of corruption through the party that
runs along the same lines has always lingered.119 In coordinating both campaign finance and policymaking for party supporters and candidates, the major parties work both sides of the
115

See Desmarais et al., supra note 108, at 196.
See id.
117
E. E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, PARTY GOVERNMENT 1 (1942).
118
See BERNARD BERELSON ET AL., VOTING: A STUDY OF OPINION FORMATION IN A
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN 183 (1954) (“[W]hat starts as a relatively unstructured
mass of diverse opinions with countless cleavages within the electorate is finally
transformed into, or at least represented by, a single basic cleavage between the
two sets of partisans. . . . [D]isagreements are reduced, simplified, and generalized into one big residual difference of opinion.”).
119
See generally NANCY L. ROSENBLUM, ON THE SIDE OF THE ANGELS: AN APPRECIATION OF PARTIES AND PARTISANSHIP 165–209 (2008) (narrating the history of Progressive antipartyism).
116
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potential quid pro quo exchange that is the core concern of
campaign finance law. The classic formulation of the quid pro
quo exchange is the trade of a contribution by the supporter for
a government favor by the recipient officeholder in return. Just
as a single officeholder might trade his vote for a campaign
contribution at the individual level, there has been historical
anxiety that parties effectuate similar trades at the aggregate
level. Parties might be able to collect contributions from supporters and promise to direct the votes of their party officeholders in return.
B. A Group-Level Theory of Quid Pro Quo Corruption
The major parties are critical mediating institutions in today’s high-level campaign finance. The major parties centralize
campaign finances for both their wealthiest supporters and
their candidates and officeholders. The parties carefully cultivate relationships between wealthy supporters and officeholders, maintain a legal and administrative infrastructure for
campaign finance, and distribute financial support efficiently
across a wide slate of candidates. The parties serve their traditional role in coordinating a large network of supporters willing
to help the party on an ongoing basis and then sustaining
those contributors’ loyalty over time on behalf of their candidates and officeholders. In this fashion, parties serve as a centralizing institution—a form of one-stop political shopping—
through which their supporters know that they will have access to party officeholders and that their financial contributions will be directed toward the party cause with the greatest
effectiveness.120 For wealthy supporters willing to donate sixfigure amounts each election cycle, the parties are essential
brokers in high-level campaign finance, particularly at the federal level.
Indeed, the wealthiest, most generous individual contributors in politics tend to donate almost exclusively to one major
party.121 For the 2012 federal election cycle, the Sunlight
Foundation found that roughly 85% of the top 1000 donors
120
See Richard Briffault, Of Constituents and Contributors 2015 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 29, 39-43 (2015) (explaining how party groups redistribute their donors’ money
to state parties, Super PACs, and candidates across the country in pursuit of the
greatest electoral return).
121
See NOLAN MCCARTY ET AL., POLARIZED AMERICA: THE DANCE OF IDEOLOGY AND
UNEQUAL RICHES 160–62 (2006); Michael Barber, Donation Motivations: Testing
Theories of Access and Ideology 8 (May 28, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with author) (finding that “individuals almost exclusively give to candidates
from only one party”).
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gave at least 90% of their contributions to only one of the major
parties.122 Less than 4% of those 1000 donors split their
money on a roughly equal basis between the parties.123 This
partisanship of individual campaign finance activity is no surprise. Such high-level giving reflects the ideological intensity of
these contributors that does not leave much room for bipartisan generosity.124 It follows then the partisanship of the contributors might be expected to increase as the money
contributed increases. All the twenty biggest individual contributors during the first three quarters of 2013 gave at least
95% of their donations to only one party.125 Along the same
lines, the 310 biggest contributors combined to donate almost
$50 million total through the first half of 2014, but 233 of those
310 contributors gave their money exclusively to one party.126
To maximize their advantage, both major parties have developed the modern legal embodiment of party campaign finance coordination in their joint fundraising committees.127
Joint fundraising committees serve as party clearinghouses for
a collection of associated candidates, party committees, and
other PACs to raise money jointly and simultaneously from
high-level contributors.128 The high-level contributor can write
a single check and rely on the joint fundraising committee to
122
See Lee Drutman, The 1000 Donors Most Likely to Benefit from McCutcheon—and What They Are Most Likely to Do, SUNLIGHT FOUND. BLOG (Oct. 2, 2013,
8:00 AM), https://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2013/10/02/top1000donors/
[http://perma.cc/MG85-8KGC].
123
See id.
124
See Barber, supra note 121, at 8; cf. Adam Bonica, Ideology and Interests
in the Political Marketplace, 57 AM. J. POL. SCI. 294, 306–08 (2013) (examining
different PACs donation behaviors).
125
See Sunlight Found. & Ctr. for Responsive Pol., Most Likely to Exceed:
Who’s Poised to Double Down Post-McCutcheon, SUNLIGHT FOUND. BLOG (Jan. 14,
2014, 11:00 AM), https://sunlightfoundation.com/blog2014/01/15/most-likelyto-exceed-whos-poised-to-double-down-post-mccutcheon/ [http://perma.cc/
4ZDK-DNUL].
126
See Russ Choma et al., Cracking the Contribution Cap: One in a Million
Americans, OPENSECRETS.ORG (Sept. 2, 2014), http://www.opensecrets.org/news/
2014/09/cracking-the-contribution-cap-one-in-a-million-americans/ [http://
perma.cc/L5XU-YGCG].
127
See, e.g., Desmarais, supra note 108, at 207 (“[T]he formal party committees . . . ‘orchestrate’ partisan strategy with PACs.”).
128
See generally Robert K. Kelner, The Practical Consequences of McCutcheon, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 380, 381 (2014) (explaining how a joint fundraising
committee operates). Joint fundraising committees coordinate with top party
officeholders and offer intimate access based on donor generosity to the party
effort. See, e.g., VOGEL, supra note 8, at 111–18 (detailing tiers of access, based on
donation size, that Romney Victory offered in 2012 to high-level donors, including
one particular three-day weekend event in Deer Valley with Mitt Romney, John
McCain, Jeb Bush, Karl Rove, Condoleezza Rice, and Reince Priebus, among
others).
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distribute the amount all at once across multiple party candidates and committees and in compliance with applicable legal
requirements. The joint fundraising committee, governed by a
specified allocation formula, therefore absorbs what would otherwise be the considerable transaction costs of broad
party-based giving across scores of party-affiliated recipients.
Joint fundraising committees raised more than $1 billion for
the major parties during 2012.129 They have multiplied further
in number since then, and in the absence of an aggregate contribution limit, can be set up to raise significantly more money
than ever before.130
The Court’s traditional conceptualization of quid pro quo
corruption includes virtually nothing about this substantial
role of the major parties in campaign finance. The Court’s
conceptualization of quid pro quo corruption identifies it as
arising primarily, and perhaps exclusively, between an individual contributor and individual candidate in a dyadic relationship. The contributor transacts with a lone candidate, trading
a financial contribution for the candidate’s preferential use of
public office. However, it is impossible to square this impoverished view of the relationship between individual contributor
and recipient with the rich party network that so much of highlevel campaign finance is embedded within.
The wealthiest high-level contributors can transact with
their party collective as much as they deal individually with any
particular candidate. High-level contributors are ready to donate on a wholesale level, spreading their money across many
party-related candidates and committees, above and beyond
any single recipient’s maximum permissible contribution. In
almost every case, these contributors want to invest in their
party beyond any particular candidate or officeholder and are
cultivated by the party as a long-term source of financial support.131 This financial support is effectively shared among
party candidates and officeholders, all of whom have a mutual
interest in maintaining the contributors’ continued investment
and support. Of course, not every party candidate will neces129

See Ctr. for Responsive Pol., Joint Fundraising Committees, OPENSECRETS.
https://opensecrets.org/jfc/ [https://perma.cc/BDL6-KNEV].
130
See Eliza Newlin Carney, Costly Midterms Fuel Hundreds of Joint Fundraising Committees, ROLL CALL BLOG (May 28, 2014, 1:59 PM), http://blogs.rollcall.
com/beltway-insiders/fundraising-campaign-committee-kay-hagan-mitch-mc
connell/ [http://perma.cc//KKT4-2XDK].
131
See Fishkin & Gerken, supra note 90, at 186 (explaining that “most major
donors have a more straightforward agenda that befits a polarized age: they want
their side to win”).
ORG,
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sarily benefit from every high-level contributor’s financial support. But in the nature of a party as a durable, ongoing
alliance, candidates and officeholders understand that they
will benefit individually over the long run when the party prospers collectively and garners high-level supporters. The party
helps collectivize campaign finance to their mutual benefit over
the full run of coordinated party activity. Party candidates and
officeholders, particularly the party leadership invested in the
party’s collective welfare, therefore track high-level contributors’ financial support and try to reciprocate that generosity
with access and informal influence to party officeholders, if
nothing else.
For this reason, it is easy to imagine the possibility of quid
pro quo corruption collectively at the party level. Under the
traditional conception of quid pro quo corruption, campaign
finance law contemplates that individual officeholders may engage in quid pro quo exchanges with contributors. If a corrupt
officeholder is willing to engage in a quid pro quo exchange,
then a group of such corrupt officeholders might be willing to
make similar exchanges as a group. They can coordinate action to satisfy their contributor and share the larger pot of
proceeds they can secure as group. Parties, at their core, are
cartels of individual officeholders who regularly coordinate
both their campaign finance and policymaking activity for their
mutual benefit.132 Just as they facilitate coordination on both
fronts for good, they also allow at least the possibility of coordination on both fronts for corruption—the two sides of the quid
pro quo exchange. This is not to say that obvious corruption
occurs all the time or even at all regularly, as I explain further
below. Nonetheless, the mechanisms of common partisanship
provide familiar, reliable bonds of political trust and teamwork
that can also serve as the foundation of such cooperation, at
least among those so willing.
The general concern about collective, party-based corruption is far from new. Similar party-related concerns have
echoed throughout American political history and most recently undergirded worries about party soft money in McConnell.133 The Rehnquist Court agreed there that the national
party committees served as the mediating institution through
which candidates and donors transacted their campaign fi132
See ALDRICH, supra note 89, at 269–74 (explaining these dynamics from a
formal perspective).
133
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
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nance relationships.134 As the Court saw it, “candidates and
donors alike have in fact exploited the soft-money loophole, the
former to increase their prospects of election and the latter to
create debt on the part of officeholders, with the national parties serving as willing intermediaries” for channeling soft
money.135 With the party committees brokering this virtual
exchange, the Court believed that “[i]t is not only plausible, but
likely, that candidates would feel grateful for such donations
and that donors would seek to exploit that gratitude.”136 Party
committees in this soft money system therefore bonded major
donors with party candidates and officeholders, facilitating
those campaign finance relationships beyond the applicable
individual contribution limits on those candidates and officeholders through the trusted stewardship of the party leadership. Richard Briffault explained at the time that the parties’
campaign finance operations relieved major donors of the need
to “reach out to multiple individual members of Congress” and
instead “centralize[d] and focus[ed]” campaign finance for them
through the parties’ active management.137 The corruption
danger was “not so much that the parties will act as conduits . . . but rather that the process of party fundraising will
give large donors special relationships with the party’s fundraisers—who are also the leaders of the party—in government.”138 Significant donors effectively transacted with major
government officeholders, who constituted the party’s leadership and were predisposed to give them a sympathetic hearing.
Of course, the party, writ large, is a sprawling coalition
encompassing a wide diversity of allied political actors, including major party donors as regular financial sponsors of the
party’s mission.139 In this sense, the broader party transcends
its formal legal manifestations and adapts its campaign finance
practices to best achieve its collective political ends under applicable regulation.140 When the broader party is united in
purpose, as it is during a general election in support of the
134

See id. at 131.
Id. at 146.
136
Id. at 145.
137
Briffault, supra note 56, at 651.
138
Briffault, supra note 39, at 356.
139
See Desmarais, supra note 108, at 196; Kang & Shepherd, Partisan Foundations, supra note 110, at 1260–66.
140
See Michael S. Kang, The Hydraulics and Politics of Party Regulation, 91
IOWA L. REV. 131, 144 (2005) (“[A] political party should not be understood as a
discrete, identifiable entity. The party may manifest itself in various legal forms,
for instance a party committee, a party convention, or in the person of a party
candidate.”).
135
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party nominee, the party acts hydraulically in concert across
different campaign finance vehicles to channel money to the
best available opportunities as law and politics dictate.141 For
this reason, it is easy to overstate the practical distinction between so-called “outside groups” closely allied with the party
coalition on one hand and the formal party committees under
the control of major party candidates and officeholders on the
other hand, at least with the party that is internally aligned in
purpose.142 The broader party can morph to allocate money
most efficiently from major donors to the party-aligned vehicles
best adapted to serve the party’s agenda and exploit regulatory
gaps, whether it is through a candidate’s own committee account, a party committee, or a nominally nonconnected group
such as a Super PAC or 501(c) organization.143
That said, the formal party to be regulated in campaign
finance is almost always a party campaign finance vehicle that
is largely under the control of major party candidates and officeholders and therefore directly implicates concerns about
quid pro quo corruption.144 Politicians are the core players in
the party coalitions who articulate the party’s mission before
the electorate, run for office, and execute the party’s policy
agenda once in government power. Contributions made directly to accounts under their personal control offer the most
direct connection between the donor and the officeholders in
position to reciprocate the favor. Such contributions bear the
greatest chance of gaining officeholders’ indebtedness or gratitude and have been so recognized by the Court’s campaign
finance decisions. Even though the Court is wrong to hold as a
matter of law that the risk of quid pro quo corruption from
independent expenditures and issue advocacy is entirely nonexistent, the Court is correct that contributions to candidates
141
See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Super PACs, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1644, 1672–82
(2012) (discussing single-candidate Super PACs during the 2010, 2011, and 2012
elections).
142
See Joseph Fishkin & Heather K. Gerken, The Two Trends That Matter for
Party Politics, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 32, 40–43 (2014) (describing the interconnectedness of outside groups and campaign leadership); see also Kang, supra
note 140, at 156–59 (describing earlier but similar interconnectedness between
party organizations and 527 groups under BCRA).
143
See, e.g., Keith E. Hamm et al., Independent Spending in State Elections,
2006–2010: Vertically Networked Political Parties Were the Real Story, Not Business, 12 FORUM 305, 314–17 (2014).
144
See Raymond J. La Raja, Richer Parties, Better Politics? Party-Centered
Campaign Finance Laws and American Democracy, 11 FORUM 313, 316 (2013)
(arguing against treatment of “all groups in the [party] network as undifferentiated
party members” because the “formal party organization is different from interest
groups”).
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and officeholders generally pose the most salient risk of quid
pro quo corruption.145 Candidates and officeholders do benefit
from other forms of financial spending on their behalf, such as
independent expenditures by outside groups, but their attention and indebtedness is attenuated by comparison, at least
dollar for dollar. Candidates and officeholders naturally value
direct control over campaign finance resources and prefer contributions into accounts they actively manage over other, less
direct forms of financial support.146
The Court traditionally regarded party campaign finance as
only an indirect source of potential corruption of candidates
and officeholders. The Court has viewed the major parties as
aligned with party candidates and officeholders, but importantly, as meaningfully separate and distinct from candidates
and officeholders for campaign finance purposes.147 The Court
understood the formal parties as special interest groups invested in the advancement of the party and therefore having
“an especially strong working relationship with their candidates.”148 For this reason, the Court recognized the government’s interest in preventing the party from selling access to
candidates and officeholders by virtue of this special relationship with them.149 At the same time, however, the Court rejected “a metaphysical identity” between party candidates and
the party committees, dismissing the notion that “the party, in
a sense, ‘is’ its candidates.”150 Instead, the Court assiduously
regarded the formal party committees as independent from
candidates and officeholders for campaign finance purposes.
The Court thus diligently defined the formal party committees’
right to engage in expenditures in support of party candidates
as roughly identical to the corresponding right of nonconnected
interest groups.151 In this sense, the Court explained that
party committees are not “in a unique position” compared to
individuals and other PACs in relation to party candidates and

145

See Kang, supra note 7, at 44–45 (developing this relative comparison).
See FEC v. Nat’l Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. 480, 498 (1985) (“[T]he absence of prearrangement and coordination undermines the value of the expenditure to the candidate, and thereby alleviates the danger that expenditures will be
given as a quid pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate.”).
147
See Fishkin & Gerken, supra note 90, at 185–86.
148
FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 448 (2001).
149
See id. at 442.
150
Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 622–23
(1996).
151
Id.

R
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officeholders, at least from the standpoint of campaign
finance.152
The Court failed to grasp that contributions to the formal
party committees are virtually direct payments to party candidates and officeholders. While the broader party as a political
coalition has a wide array of resources across its diverse membership, the formal party committees are themselves just campaign finance entities under the control of the party
politicians.153 Of course, the major party coalitions encompass
many important players beyond their candidates and officeholders, but the formal party committees themselves do not
have any serious grassroots involvement and are not in any
sense teeming microcosms of these larger party coalitions.154
The national party committees are merely legal entities created almost entirely for campaign finance purposes, largely
dominated by, managed by, and composed of party candidates
and officeholders. For instance, four of the six major party
committees at the federal level—both major parties’ Senate
Campaign Committees and Congressional Campaign Committees—are composed entirely of federal officeholders and have
the singular purpose and function of assisting party candidates
win election rather than express any independent ideological
voice.155 Contributions to the party committees are not merely
donations to a coalition group that happens to enjoy a close
relationship to the party’s candidates. Contributions to the
party committees are donations to bank accounts that a lead152

Colo. Republican, 533 U.S. at 435.
See, e.g., Kate Andrias, Hallowed-Out Democracy, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE
48, 48–49 (2014) (“The Democratic and Republican Senatorial and Congressional
Campaign Committees have, for many years, been national fundraising organizations, organized and controlled by senior federal elected officials, with no grassroots base.”).
154
See Fishkin & Gerken, supra note 90, at 208 (noting the differences between the party coalition and its campaign finance entities); Suzy Khimm, The
Obama Gap, NEW REPUBLIC (June 25, 2015), https://newrepublic.com/article/
122062/obama-gap-case-study-electoral-failure [https://perma.cc/XWH57UBK] (“Democratic Party committees . . . ‘have become communications machines, and they’ve gotten away from being organizing machines.’” (quoting Democratic Party operative Steve Schale)).
155
See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 155 (2003); Shea, supra note 98, at
41–50 (describing the development of “service-oriented parties”). The Democratic
and Republican National Committees are broader based in the sense that, by my
count, roughly half of their official membership consist of officeholders and candidates, but they nonetheless serve the predominant function of serving and supporting candidates. See Galvin, supra note 101, at 57 (“[T]hough [these party
committees] once controlled politicians and subordinated their ambitions to the
needs of the collectivity, the national committees now play a supportive role,
offering resources and services to candidates who seek their help.”)
153

R

R
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ership group of candidates and officeholders control and manage for their collective purposes.156 The party committees are
not simply in a position to provide access to the party candidates and officeholders; they are the party candidates and officeholders in a meaningful sense.157
C. The New Case for the Regulation of Party Campaign
Finance
The case for group-level corruption intuitively follows from
the theory of individual-level quid pro quo corruption. Just as
an individual officeholder can engage in a quid pro quo exchange, so too might a group of officeholders engage in a quid
pro quo exchange as a club. As an extreme example for purposes of clarity, a club of officeholders might decide that they
can accomplish more as a unified group and have more to sell if
they offer their votes together as a bloc. They agree to coordinate their action and offer their bloc support to contributors
willing to provide campaign finance donations in exchange.
The club of officeholders would agree to aggregate these donations and share money to the mutual benefit of club members.
Provided the club members were confident that the money
would be spent to their mutual benefit, they should not care
particularly where the money gets deposited. What matters is
the strength of their mutual benefit and their confidence in the
club leadership. The money might be deposited in a club account that their leadership controls, or deposited in their various individual accounts to be squared up later to ensure fair
distribution. If the club members agree to engage in this type
of quid pro quo arrangement with contributors, it is analytically identical to prohibited quid pro quo exchanges by individual officeholders with individual contributors. This type of
group-level quid pro quo exchange requires coordination
across officeholders, but it is quid pro quo corruption
nonetheless.
Party relationships offer the most plausible framework
within which the potential for this type of group-level corruption can build. The relationships of trust, cooperation, and
teamwork within the major parties are already pervasive and
constantly exercised among officeholders on both ends of any
hypothetical quid pro quo exchange—campaign finance fundraising and policymaking activity. Party candidates and of156
157

See Andrias, supra note 153, at 48–49.
See id.
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ficeholders already coordinate their campaign finance and
policymaking activity along party lines nearly every day of their
political lives. Frances Lee has argued that today’s officeholders and candidates are motivated by a predominant norm of
“teamsmanship” under which officeholders view their fates as
inextricably bound up with their party’s collective fortunes to a
historically uncommon degree.158 As a result, the same party
relationships of trust, cooperation, and teamwork between
sympathetic officeholders of the same party offer perhaps the
most promising seed for any effort at group-level quid pro quo,
whether it is freestanding or ongoing.159
Granted, only a fraction of party activity among officeholders might be characterized as anything even approaching this
sort of group-level quid pro quo. Just as most campaign finance and policymaking activity of individual officeholders
should not be characterized as engaging in individual-level
quid pro quo exchanges, the same is the case for party activity
and group-level quid pro quo. However, just as the plausibility
of individual-level quid pro quo exchanges gives rise to a government interest in their prophylactic prevention, the
equivalent plausibility of group-level corruption should give
rise to a government interest in the reasonable regulation of
party-mediated campaign finance.
Any theory of group-level corruption inherits the theoretical and normative complications of individual-level corruption.
If you do not support campaign finance regulation to combat
individual-level quid pro quo corruption, you are not any more
likely to support regulation to combat group-level corruption,
but the analytical structure of the arguments for and against
regulation remain basically the same. Critics of campaign finance law argue that campaign finance regulation targeting
quid pro quo corruption is simply redundant of bribery
laws160—a charge that the Court decisively dismissed.161 Critics also argue that the risk of quid pro quo corruption is overblown and empirically unsubstantiated.162 Still others argue
158
See generally FRANCES E. LEE, BEYOND IDEOLOGY: POLITICS, PRINCIPLES, AND
PARTISANSHIP IN THE U.S. SENATE 49–73 (2009) (finding that greater party conflict
among contemporary Republicans and Democrats is not only based on ideology
but also increased coordination among the parties).
159
See id.
160
See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 428 (2000) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing contribution limits as massively overinclusive when
“[b]ribery laws bar precisely the quid pro quo arrangements that are targeted”).
161
See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 27–30 (1976).
162
See Stephen Ansolabehere et al., Why is There so Little Money in U.S.
Politics?, 17 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 105, 117–27 (2003); Bradley A. Smith, Faulty
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that the government’s interest in the prevention of quid pro quo
corruption boils down essentially to speech equalization or the
imposition of a particular normative understanding of the democratic process.163 All these criticisms apply to a theory of
group-level corruption with no less force because they apply
generally to any theory of campaign finance law based on the
prevention of quid pro quo corruption. Recognizing the theoretical possibility of group-level corruption does not change the
basic analytical premises of this debate or the basic quid pro
quo framework itself. Across the individual- and group-level
versions of quid pro quo corruption, the notion of the hypothetical quid pro quo exchange remains constant, as well as the
democratic theory for its regulation with all its strengths and
weaknesses.
It is true that a group-level quid pro quo requires coordination among more actors than an individual-level quid pro quo.
Individual-level quid pro quo exchanges can be executed by a
solitary wrongdoer without any additional need to cooperate or
communicate with other officeholders. As the number of involved officeholders in a quid pro quo exchange increases, the
challenges of coordination increase as well. Group-level quid
pro quo exchanges involve more than a single officeholder and
therefore require at least two or more officeholders to cooperate, understand each other, and act in some sort of concert.
What is more, the risk of detection only increases as the club
expands. As a result, group-level quid pro quo exchanges seem
plausible only when the benefits to the officeholders and contributors are larger than they need to be for a comparable individual-level exchange. As the scale of the hypothetical deal
increases, the costs increase for the officeholders such that the
payoff must be higher to justify those higher costs.
However, it is difficult to reconcile a principled position of
concern about individual-level corruption with absolute dismissiveness about any conceivable government measure to
combat group-level corruption. Recognition of the greater coordination costs and lesser likelihood of group-level corrupt exchanges can be dialed into the calibration of campaign finance
regulation. In other words, regulation of group-level corruption
should properly be less intrusive and set at higher dollar
thresholds. A lighter regulatory touch for such regulation is
Assumptions and Undemocratic Consequences of Campaign Finance Reform, 105
YALE L.J. 1049, 1067–71 (1996).
163
See Strauss, supra note 29, at 1385–87; Kathleen M. Sullivan, Political
Money and Freedom of Speech, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 633, 671–75, 678–82 (1997).
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appropriate, and should be constitutionally required, because
group-level corruption is far less likely at lower dollar figures
that do not reflect the higher costs described above for officeholders. The tailoring of regulation must and should account
for these practical differences between individual- and grouplevel corruption.
Nonetheless, if the risk of individual-level corruption is
large enough to justify a federal contribution limit of $2600 on
candidates,164 there surely must be grounds for regulation at
some higher dollar figures on group-level campaign finance as
well. An individual contribution of $2600 does not seem very
much money in a federal campaign finance system that spent
roughly $7 billion in the 2012 election.165 There surely must
be some form of government regulation comparably justified by
a similarly worrisome risk of group-level quid pro quo corruption, however less likely it may seem relative to individual-level
corruption. For some, the comparison may simply underscore
the disutility of base contribution limits on individual officeholders at their current dollar thresholds. Even so, the broader
point is that it is difficult to sustain the constitutional permissibility of current regulation predicated on individual-level corruption without admitting the argument for some appropriate
level of regulation based on group-level concerns.
Group-level corruption does not require the wholesale corruption of a major party. Wholesale capture of a major party
would be quite difficult, if not impossible, because of the size
and internal diversity of the major party coalitions. Through a
Madisonian lens, the major parties encompass so many candidates and officeholders who collectively aggregate the interests
of so many different constituents across their broad coalitions
that party politics necessarily dilute any particular interest
within that complex mix.166 Although they are bonded by ideo164

See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1442 (2014).
Tarini Parti, FEC: $7 Billion Spent on 2012 Campaigns, POLITICO (Jan. 31,
2013, 10:26 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2013/01/7-billion-spent-on2012-campaign-fec-says-087051 [http://perma.cc/43X3-C7EU]. The price of
buying an important officeholder’s gratitude is suggested by ambassadorships
handed to campaign finance bundlers without a foreign service or foreign policy
background. See Michael Beckel & Chris Zubak-Skees, Wanna Be Ambassador of
Argentina, SLATE (Feb. 7, 2014, 7:34 PM), http://slate.com/articles/news_and_
politics/politics/2014/02/map_of_ambassador_posts_given_to_obama_s_top_
fundraisers_noah_bryson_mamet.html [http://perma.cc/JDC3-6TLU] (estimating $500,000 as the entry price among President Obama’s nominees for
ambassadorships).
166
See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, Romanticizing Democracy, Political Fragmentation, and the Decline of American Government, 124 YALE L.J. 804, 839 (2014)
165
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logical compatibility, the American major parties in the prevailing first-past-the-post election system are so diverse internally
that swinging party policy too far in any direction is checked by
intraparty competition over the party’s policymaking agenda.
In FEC v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee,
the Tenth Circuit dismissed worries about corruption through
the party committees because it believed that parties “represent a broad-based coalition of interests” and thus are “simply too large and too diverse to be corrupted by any one
faction.”167
The possibility of group-level quid pro quo corruption described above is most likely to be party-based corruption, mediated or facilitated by trusted party relationships, rather than
the wholesale purchase of an entire party’s officeholding roster.
Group-level corruption does not require the corruption of every
officeholder of a major party across a wide swath of policymaking to be worrisome. The major parties comprehensively involve themselves in nearly every aspect of electoral politics at
the national and state levels such that institutionalized relationships of trust, cooperation, and teamwork supply a useful
framework within which group-level corruption is plausible
among certain subgroups of particularly likeminded copartisans.168 The major parties provide thick networks and party
subgroups where certain officeholders’ interests are sufficiently
intertwined and whose trustworthiness has been mutually well
established. Indeed, the pervasiveness of party linkages and
relationships in national and state politics belie any assumption that concerns about quid pro quo corruption are plausible
at only the individual level, between lone officeholders and contributors without any party linkage.
What is more, campaign contributors interested in quid
pro quo-like exchanges typically need not purchase the assistance of an entire major party to accomplish their ends or to
(explaining that, by aggregating so many interests, parties “dilute the role of
money”).
167
213 F.3d 1221, 1231 (10th Cir. 2000).
168
This sort of team coordination occurs among contributors as well. For
example, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) carefully selected
residents in each congressional district to serve as point people and funneled
contributions through them as bundlers to build up their influence with their
congressperson. See Connie Bruck, Friends of Israel, NEW YORKER, Sept. 1, 2014,
at 50, 54. As one former AIPAC member explains, “AIPAC has to teach people
discipline—because all those people who are giving five thousand dollars would
ordinarily want recognition. The purpose is to make the [selected resident] into a
big shot—he’s the one who has all this money to give to the congressman’s campaign.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).
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raise serious normative concerns about corruption. The assistance of just enough officeholders’ help, on just the discrete set
of policymaking actions necessary to accomplish what might be
reasonably limited aims, is optimal from the standpoint of cost
and political risk. Group-level corruption therefore can be
party based, or party mediated, among a limited number of
collaborating candidates and officeholders, linked by preexisting party relationships, without needing to draw on the entire
party’s help and collusion.
D. A Path Not Taken, and the Potential Way Forward
The doctrinal advantage of a group-based theory of corruption, from the standpoint of stare decisis, is that it fits well
inside the Court’s traditional understanding of quid pro quo
corruption. The recent development of the Court’s campaign
finance jurisprudence has precipitously narrowed the scope of
permissible regulation since its apex in McConnell.169 Led by
Justice Kennedy, the Court has identified the Buckley core
conception of quid pro quo corruption as the sole doctrinal
justification for regulation beyond basic disclosure and thus
put in constitutional jeopardy all regulation upheld previously
under other justifications.170 Determining grounds for doctrinal justification under the core conception of quid pro quo
corruption is therefore critical for any road forward for campaign finance regulation under the law as the Roberts Court
now charts it.
Along these lines, a group-based theory of corruption
builds on, rather than diverges from, the Court’s core conception of quid pro quo corruption. It is merely the aggregate
application of what begins as a dyadic framework of quid pro
quo corruption between contributor and officeholder, inheriting all the strengths and weaknesses that the Roberts Court
tolerates for an individual contributor and individual officeholder. The basic notion of quid pro quo exchange remains
essentially unchanged as the core harm, adjusting only the
number of officeholders that plausibly can participate in the
underlying understanding. The proposition that officeholders
might cooperate with each other in this way is grounded in the
fact that their cooperation in both campaign finance and policymaking is thoroughly mediated by party relationships whose
function is the constant coordination of party members in both
169
170

McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 359 (2010).
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these primary spheres of American politics. It accommodates
the basic fact that party candidates and officeholders hardly
ever act entirely in isolation from one another and are rarely
unaffected by their party relationships in any meaningful
sense.
A group-based theory of quid pro quo corruption can replace as constitutional justification alternative theories for
campaign finance regulation that have been discarded by the
Roberts Court. Even as the Roberts Court turns away from
what it sees as the excesses of the Rehnquist Court on campaign finance law, a group-based theory of quid pro quo corruption might serve as stronger ground for the constitutionality
of party-related campaign finance regulation where the worry
about aggregate corruption is cognizable.
One recent case where a group-based theory of corruption
might have supported the constitutionality of campaign finance regulation is McCutcheon v. FEC.171 In that case, Republican activist Shaun McCutcheon challenged the federal
aggregate contribution limit that set a maximum cap on total
contributions by a single individual in a federal election cycle.172 McCutcheon had contributed to sixteen Republican
candidates for federal office, all three national Republican
Party committees, and several other conservative PACs for the
2011-2012 federal election cycle.173 McCutcheon complied
with every individual contribution limit applicable to those donations, but McCutcheon still wanted to donate to at least a
dozen more candidates in the same federal cycle.174 However,
he was barred from doing so, not by any individual contribution limit, but by the federal aggregate contribution limit that
restricted the total amount one individual can contribute during that election cycle to $117,000.175 Additional contributions
during the same cycle would have put him over the then-applicable aggregate cap, which he decided to challenge.176
The Supreme Court struck down the aggregate cap in McCutcheon as inconsistent with its narrow framework for quid
pro quo corruption.177 As the Court saw it, the only corruption
interest to be considered was dyadic, between the individual
contributor on one hand and individual officeholder on the
171
172
173
174
175
176
177

134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014).
Id. at 1443.
See McCutcheon v. FEC, 893 F.Supp. 2d 133, 136 (D.D.C. 2012).
Id.
See id.
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1443.
Id. at 1462.
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other hand. This corruption interest was addressed by the
individual contribution limit already capping the maximum
that McCutcheon could give any particular candidate or officeholder.178 The aggregate contribution limit, though, blocked
McCutcheon at the aggregate maximum from giving even a
single dollar to any other candidate. It was hard for the Court
to understand how the aggregate limit permitted maximum
donations to seventeen candidates, but even a single dollar to
an eighteenth candidate could be prohibited outright on anticorruption grounds beyond the aggregate limit.179 As the
Court saw it, there was little sense from an anticorruption
standpoint for restricting what a contributor could give one
candidate based on what the contributor had donated previously to others.180 The constitutional analysis of quid pro quo
corruption could be judged only candidate by candidate, each
candidate independent of others, such that contributions to
one candidate could not alter the risk of corruption for any
others.
But obviously they just might. Contributors who operated
near or at the aggregate limit were already donating six-figure
amounts to influence federal elections and typically, as I have
described, contributed those amounts almost exclusively to
one party or the other.181 Such contributors, like Shaun McCutcheon himself, are often party activists, committed to one
major party’s cause and invested in the party’s success.182
Their relationship is as much with the party, or at least the
party leadership, as it is with each individual candidate they
support. They are valued by the party as prominent, important
supporters who are likely to continue contributing on a regular
basis and are thus cultivated as partners by the party with
preferential access and influence. When they donated to multiple candidates up to what was then the applicable aggregate
178
Id. at 1452 (noting that “Congress’s selection of a $5,200 base limit indicates its belief that contributions of that amount or less do not create a cognizable
risk of corruption”).
179
Id. at 1451 (posing the parallel question why “it is perfectly fine to contribute $5,200 to nine candidates but somehow corrupt to give the same amount to a
tenth”).
180
See id. at 1452.
181
See supra notes 173–74 and accompanying text.
182
See, e.g., Mary Orndorff Troyan, Alabama GOP Donor Challenges Limits,
USA TODAY (Aug. 9, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/
2013/08/09/Alabama-gop-donor-challenges-limits/2634671 [http://perma.cc/
8CCF-KM2G] (quoting Alabama Republican Party Chairman Bill Armistead saying
that McCutcheon “wanted to make a difference, and do whatever it takes to help
the party achieve its goal”).
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limits, they did so as party sponsors who intended to back the
party on a wholesale basis and transacted with it as their collective counterparty.
In this sense, the aggregate limit served a parallel purpose
in guarding against aggregate, party-based corruption as the
individual contribution limit serves in guarding against individual-level corruption. The individual contribution limit has
been upheld as a measure to check the risk of quid pro quo
exchange with an individual officeholder by limiting the maximum amount of money that a contributor can transfer to the
officeholder. The limit may not eliminate the risk of quid pro
quo corruption, but by capping the maximum exchange, the
limit puts a ceiling on the magnitude of the possible quid pro
quo. Just so, the aggregate contribution limit arguably served
a parallel purpose for high-level contributors who transact with
the party on a wholesale basis. High-level contributors hope to
transfer large amounts of money to the party by parceling out
many individual contributions to many of the party’s candidates. In McCutcheon’s case, it would have been to almost
thirty candidates in the absence of the aggregate limit.183 Indeed, in the case of a well-organized joint fundraising committee, high-level contributors may donate in the spirit of
supporting the party’s collective effort without necessarily
knowing a great deal about the individual recipients allocated
their money.
The aggregate limit capped this total amount per election
cycle that a high-level contributor can transfer to the party as a
whole. By doing so, the aggregate limit served to address the
most extreme concerns about high-level contributors gaining
the same type of leverage over the party as the individual limit
ostensibly prevents at the individual level over particular candidates. Even if one estimates the risk of this type of partybased corruption to be minimal, the aggregate limit could have
been calibrated to a justifiably high enough amount where the
associated risk is equivalent to the risk of corruption addressed
at the individual level by the $2600 individual contribution
limit.184
The Court’s decision in McCutcheon, however, did not turn
on any theory of aggregate, group-level corruption. Indeed, the
government relied mainly on a theory of anticircumvention in
183

See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1443.
See Issacharoff, supra note 26, at 110 (“Does anyone really think that it
makes a difference in terms of corruption whether the limits are set at $2700 or
$27,000?”).
184
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its briefing of the case.185 The government argued that even
after a contributor had donated the maximum permissible
amount to a particular candidate under the individual contribution limit, the contributor might be able to funnel more
money to the same candidate in the absence of an aggregate
limit.186 Without the aggregate limit, the contributor might be
able to circumvent the individual contribution limit by donating to other candidates and committees who would transfer the
contributor’s money back to the original candidate in excess of
the original individual limit. This circumvention-based argument by the government had the great advantage of being
grounded in the basic dyadic framework of quid pro quo corruption insisted upon by the Roberts Court.187 It justified the
aggregate limit based on the familiar risk of quid pro quo corruption from direct exchanges between a large-dollar contributor and a particular candidate or officeholder. The risk allows
the government to cap those direct exchanges, as well as otherwise coordinated expenditures, in the interest of anticorruption. Because individual contribution limits were
constitutionally permissible for this reason, the government
argued that the aggregate limit was therefore also constitutionally permissible as a backstop to prevent circumvention of
those individual limits.188 The Court, though, rejected the government’s anticircumvention arguments because it did not see
sufficient basis for such worry about circumvention, which at
least a few Justices considered wildly overblown.189
The government did discuss the role of the major parties
during the McCutcheon oral argument, despite little mention of
it in its briefing.190 Solicitor General Don Verrilli observed in
his oral argument about the party collectivization of campaign
finance that “every candidate is going to get a slice of the
money, and every candidate is going to know that this person
who wrote the multimillion dollar check has helped, not only
the candidate, but the whole team, and that creates a particular sense of indebtedness.”191 Verrilli argued that this coordi185

See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1457–58.
Id.
187
See id. at 1450 (explaining that “Congress may target only a specific type of
corruption—‘quid pro quo’ corruption”).
188
See id. at 1442.
189
See id. at 1452–56 (calling these worries “divorced from reality” and “highly
implausible”).
190
See id. at 1460 (noting that the government “shifted its focus from Buckley’s anticircumvention rationale” at oral argument).
191
Transcript of Oral Argument at 39, McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434
(2014) (No. 12-536).
186
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nation and teamwork meant that “every officeholder in the
party is likely to be leaned on by the party leadership to deliver
legislation to the people who are buttering their bread.”192 But
this party-related argument was not the focus of the government’s briefing, and perhaps for good reason. The Court had
never adopted or articulated such a theory nor even seriously
been presented with it. When the Court considered the role of
the major parties in campaign finance, it regarded them as
allied with candidates but analytically separate and distinct
from their officeholders and candidates for campaign finance
purposes.193 As a result, the Court concentrated mainly on the
role that parties might play as conduits of money to and from
candidates in a similar vein as the McCutcheon anticircumvention theory, where parties are allied abettors of candidates but
not themselves literal aggregates of individual candidates.194
To be blunt, there is little reason to suspect that the
Roberts Court itself would adopt such a theory of group-level
corruption. In its plurality opinion in McCutcheon, the Roberts
Court addressed Verrilli’s party-based arguments without any
hint of sympathy. The plurality opinion interpreted Verrilli to
argue that “there is an opportunity for corruption whenever a
large check is given to a legislator, even if the check consists of
contributions within the base limits to be appropriately divided
among numerous candidates and committees.”195 Under this
argument, the aggregate limit “ensure[s] that the check amount
does not become too large.”196 The plurality acknowledged that
“[o]f course a candidate would be pleased with a donor who
contributed not only to the candidate himself, but also to other
candidates from the same party, to party committees, and to
PACs supporting the party.”197 But even after admitting that
party-related campaign finance can create indebtedness, the
plurality rejected the proposition that this risk of indebtedness
justified the aggregate limit.198
The McCutcheon plurality turned largely to consequentialist grounds for doing so. The plurality explained that such an
extension of the quid pro quo framework to the party context
would “target[ ] as corruption the general, broad-based support
192

Id. at 39–40.
See, e.g., FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431
(2001); Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604 (1996).
194
See 533 U.S. at 431; 518 U.S. at 604.
195
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1460.
196
Id.
197
Id. at 1461.
198
Id. at 1462.
193
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of a political party.”199 The plurality did not reject the notion
that party-related campaign finance can create the type of gratitude or indebtedness upon which quid pro quo exchanges rest,
but it instead offered only that there is “a clear, administrable
line between money beyond the base limits funneled in an identifiable way to a candidate—for which the candidate feels obligated—and money within the base limits given widely to a
candidate’s party—for which the candidate, like all other members of the party, feels grateful.”200 The plurality therefore
seemed not to distinguish individual and party-related aggregate corruption, acknowledging risks of both, except to shelter
party-related campaign finance activity as a matter of administrability and to restrict the government’s anticorruption interest on prudential grounds. The plurality explained only that
doing otherwise would “dramatically expand government regulation of the political process.”201
Although the Roberts Court is exceedingly unlikely to
adopt any extension of the basic quid pro quo framework, this
is not to concede that a future Supreme Court will never adopt
any extension of the quid pro quo framework. The dramatic
reversal of campaign finance law, which I have previously
called the end of campaign finance law as we knew it, occurred
after the replacement of just two Justices who were ideologically moderate on campaign finance with two who are aggressively hostile to campaign finance regulation.202 As a realist
matter, the tide of campaign finance law could shift just as
quickly back toward the government deference that reigned for
two decades during the Rehnquist Court. A future Court, one
more predisposed toward campaign finance regulation than the
current one, still would need to deal with Court precedent that
now has significantly narrowed the government’s regulatory
interest and focused it squarely on quid pro quo corruption.203
From this perspective, legal theories that start from the core
conception of individual quid pro quo corruption but build logi199

Id. at 1460.
Id. at 1461.
201
Id.
202
See Adam Liptak, Former Justice O’Connor Sees Ill in Election Finance
Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2010, at A18 (reporting retired Justice O’Connor’s
disagreement with Citizens United and the Roberts Court’s direction on campaign
finance law); Jeffrey Rosen, Why I Miss Sandra Day O’Connor, NEW REPUBLIC (July
1, 2011), http://newrepublic.com/article/politics/91146/Sandra-day-o-connorsupreme-court-alito [http://perma.cc/5FKH-Y5DA] (reporting the same).
203
See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 349 (2010) (observing that
the government was forced to abandon Austin’s antidistortion rationale in light of
the Roberts Court’s direction on campaign finance).
200
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cally outward to support regulation are particularly valuable.
In other words, even a future Court sympathetic to campaign
finance regulation will need to draw on creative extensions on
quid pro quo corruption if it wants to retrofit constitutional
justifications under the Roberts Court precedent and preserve
any of today’s regulatory apparatus.
Any such future effort would need to begin now, if only in
dissent under the Roberts Court. One need look only to Justice
Kennedy’s dissents in earlier campaign finance decisions
under the Rehnquist Court for a model. Justice Kennedy was a
consistent dissenter from the Rehnquist Court’s general deference to the government in campaign finance law, and his dissenting opinions provided the intellectual groundwork for the
Roberts Court’s subsequent reversal in course. In Austin, Justice Kennedy protested in dissent that “the danger of a political
quid pro quo is insufficient” to uphold any restriction of independent expenditures.204 He argued that “[c]andidate campaign contributions are subject to greater regulation because of
the enhanced risk of corruption,” while by contrast “independent expenditures pose no such risk.”205 Again in McConnell,
Justice Kennedy pressed in dissent for what the majority there
dismissed as a “crabbed view of corruption,”206 arguing once
more that “only a single definition of corruption has been found
to identify political corruption successfully and to distinguish
good political responsiveness from bad—that is quid pro
quo.”207 In Justice Kennedy’s view, the government’s interest
in preventing corruption therefore “only justifies regulating
candidates’ and officeholders’ receipt of what we can call the
‘quids’ in the quid pro quo formulation.”208 When the Court’s
personnel turnover shifted Justice Kennedy from dissent to the
leading voice on campaign finance law, Justice Kennedy drew
heavily from his earlier dissents as foundation for his majority
opinion in Citizens United v. FEC. His majority opinion was a
virtual carbon copy of his McConnell dissent, citing and quoting
from it extensively, in overruling both Austin and McConnell
because “independent expenditures do not lead to, or create
the appearance of, quid pro quo corruption.”209
204
Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 703 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
205
Id. at 702 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
206
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 152 (2003).
207
Id. at 297 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
208
Id. at 292 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
209
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S 310, 360 (2010).
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I have written elsewhere to criticize Justice Kennedy’s campaign finance jurisprudence across these cases as well as
others,210 but the relevant point here is that the remarkable
reversal of campaign finance law during Justice Kennedy’s tenure sprouted from dissents setting the groundwork for what
later ascended to the majority. Just so, any future reversal of
the Court’s direction on campaign finance law under new personnel would likewise draw strength from a similar process of
consistent dissent that patiently charts the path for that course
correction. In this sense, development of campaign finance
theory that will not draw five votes from the current Roberts
Court is far from a waste of time and intellectual energy. Development of theory, such as a group-based theory of quid pro quo
corruption, should account for doctrinal opportunity under
current law to move in a different direction later on and simply
bide its time. The group-based theory of quid pro quo corruption might not only represent a previous path not taken; it
might identify the road forward for campaign finance law as
well.
III
THE NEXT CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES FOR PARTY
CAMPAIGN FINANCE
This Part analyzes three pending constitutional challenges
to significant aspects of party-related campaign finance law
whose de-regulation has been proposed in at least some
quarters: (1) pay-to-play laws; (2) party soft money; and (3)
party-connected Super PACs. These challenges hinge upon judicial willingness to adopt the logic of a group-based theory of
quid pro quo corruption, and the constitutional stakes are surprisingly high. Depending on how courts approach these
cases, the constitutional results could end with the nearly total
deregulation of party campaign finance.
A. Pay-to-Play Laws
The federal prohibition on campaign finance contributions
by government contractors is the federal version of a common
state and municipal regulation known as a pay-to-play law.211
Pay-to-play laws impose prohibitions on individuals in the regular business of seeking a government contract on the theory
210
See, e.g., Kang, supra note 7, at 24–27; Michael S. Kang, After Citizens
United, 44 IND. L. REV. 243, 248–54 (2010).
211
See 2 U.S.C. § 441c (2012); see also 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)–5 (2013) (regulating political contributions by SEC-registered investment advisers).
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that they constitute a class of potential contributors at particular risk of engaging in quid pro quo exchanges with government
officials.212 Certain government officeholders are potentially in
positions to influence decisions on government contracts and
thereby reciprocate their campaign contributions with a concrete, timely payoff by helping them win government work on
favorable terms. The outright prohibition on contributions is
restrictive but justified by the immediacy of the corruption risk
with this limited class of prospective contributors seeking discrete, private gain from business with the federal
government.213
The constitutional vulnerability of the federal pay-to-play
law, challenged in Wagner v. FEC,214 is its breadth. A federal
pay-to-play law bars any person who contracts with the federal
government from contributing, directly or indirectly, to “any
political party, committee, or candidate for public office or to
any person for any political purpose or use.”215 State and municipal pay-to-play laws are sometimes, but not always, more
calibrated, limiting the prohibition on contributions only to officeholders in a position of direct decision-making authority
with respect to the relevant contractor. In Green Party of Connecticut v. Garfield, for instance, the Second Circuit upheld a
Connecticut pay-to-play law barring contributions to officials
in the same government branch that had jurisdiction over the
relevant contractor’s bids.216 The federal pay-to-play law
makes no such distinctions, barring contributions to “any political party, committee or candidate,” and thus prohibits contributions even to candidates for offices that command no
direct authority over the contractor’s business.217
In Wagner v. FEC, the plaintiffs attacked this potential
overbreadth. The plaintiffs distinguished previous judicial decisions sustaining state and local pay-to-play laws “because
the connection between the contract award and the contribu212
See Samuel Issacharoff, On Political Corruption, 124 HARV. L. REV. 118,
139–40 (2010).
213
See id. at 126–28 (presenting the case for regulation based on “clientelist”
concerns rather than the traditional prevention of corruption).
214
793 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (en banc), aff’g 717 F.3d 1007 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
215
2 U.S.C. § 441c(a).
216
616 F.3d 189 (2d. Cir. 2010).
217
2 U.S.C. § 441c(a). Federal contractors, however, may make independent
expenditures, which the federal prohibition does not cover. See Laurence D.
Laufer & Rebecca Moll Freed, Independent Expenditures: A Mechanism for Bribery
in the Procurement Process? N.J. LAW., Feb. 2013, at 41 (criticizing the same
underinclusiveness under New Jersey’s pay-to-play law).
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tion was much closer than it is in the federal system.”218 Federal elected officials—the President, Vice President, and
Congress—play “no direct role in awarding contracts” in the
federal system.219 What is more, the plaintiffs contended that
the prohibition was overinclusive in banning contributions to
political parties, which “have no possible role in federal contracting today.”220 Of course, the plaintiffs were correct in a
formal sense that federal officials, including the President, have
no direct legal control over contracting decisions decided by
executive agencies. This focus on the officeholding recipient of
the contribution mirrors the dyadic focus of the Court’s quid
pro quo corruption framework. The common question is
whether the specific recipient of a contribution is in position to
directly reciprocate the favor, except that the plaintiffs’ pay-toplay analysis contemplates a quite specific payoff and therefore
limits the corruption risk to recipients who can individually
execute that specific payoff.
The underlying questions about quid pro quo corruption in
Wagner thus parallel those in McCutcheon, even if the pay-toplay law appears quite different from the aggregate contribution limit. In McCutcheon, the Court viewed quid pro quo corruption as potentially occurring only on a pairwise basis
between an individual contributor and an individual candidate
who will be in a direct position to pay back the contributor by
virtue of his or her public office.221 The Wagner plaintiffs, in
supplemental briefing, drew from McCutcheon to argue that
“contributions [from the contractor] to federal candidates and
committees might create feelings of gratefulness in the recipients,” but that the government’s anticorruption interest simply
did not apply if “the recipients do not award contracts.”222 As I
have already argued, this type of dyadic analysis from McCutcheon too narrowly focuses on the recipient as the sole conceivable counterparty in the plausible quid pro quo and misses the
political interconnectedness among candidates and officeholders.223 Of course, the President and key members of Congress
do not need direct control over specific contracting decisions to
218
Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 45, Wagner v. FEC, 717 F.3d 1007 (D.C.
Cir. 2013) (No. 12-5365).
219
Id.
220
Id. at 47.
221
See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1441 (2014) (describing quid pro
quo corruption as the “direct exchange of an official act for money”).
222
Supplemental Brief for Plaintiffs at 9, Wagner v. FEC, 717 F.3d 1007 (D.C.
Cir. 2013) (No. 13-5162).
223
See supra subpart II.D.
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have ample means of potential influence over them. A grouplevel conception of quid pro quo corruption, as opposed to the
Court’s dyadic approach, accounts for the intense interconnectedness of public officeholders, at least those from the same
major party, that generates countless opportunities for reciprocation through political allies far beyond the set of specific
decisions that any single officeholder officially controls.224
For the same reason, a group-level conception of corruption is relevant to the federal pay-to-play prohibition on contributions to party committees. Again, the formal party
committees have no direct control over government decisions
and do not themselves hold any public office. However, the
party committees are composed of and directed by officeholders
and candidates. It would be myopic not to see the party committees as bound up with officeholders and candidates as I
have explained. Party-mediated corruption involving government contractors is not at all hypothetical. Indeed, the federal
pay-to-play statute itself originated from the famous “Democratic campaign-book racket” of the 1930s.225 Democratic
Party agents coerced government contractors to buy quotas of
worthless political books from the party as a price of entry,
scaled to the value of work a respective contractor obtains from
the federal government.226 The district court and later the D.C.
Circuit in Wagner cited the campaign-book racket, as well as
recent corruption scandals involving government contractors
at the state and local level, as sufficient grounds for the pay-toplay law.227 As the district court put it, “Congress need not roll
back its longstanding ban and wait for a scandal to arise in
order to provide evidence that § 441c prevents corruption.”228
The broad federal contribution ban across all candidates,
officeholders, and party committees implicitly acknowledges
the pervasive interconnectedness among party politicians that
make narrow prohibitions in this context almost certainly un224

See LEE, supra note 158, at 71–73.
See Wagner v. FEC, 901 F. Supp. 2d 101, 107–08 (D.D.C. 2012) (discussing the book racket as the impetus for the federal pay-to-play law); see also
MICHAEL J. WEBBER, NEW DEAL FAT CATS: BUSINESS, LABOR, AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE IN
THE 1936 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 70–77 (2000) (recounting the Democratic Convention Book scandal of 1936).
226
See Wagner, 901 F. Supp. 2d at 108.
227
Id. at 109.
228
Id.; see also Wagner v. FEC, 793 F.3d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“As the Supreme Court has recognized, ‘no data can be marshaled to capture perfectly the
counterfactual world in which’ an existing campaign finance restriction ‘do[es] not
exist.’” (quoting McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1457 (2014)) (alteration in
original)).
225

R
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derinclusive. There are good policy reasons to craft pay-to-play
prohibitions more narrowly in light of First Amendment and
other prudential considerations, but if these prohibitions are to
have any effectiveness, it is perfectly sensible to permit the
government a measure of broader discretion as a practical safeguard against corruption concerns.229 The breadth of the federal law serves as a common sense prophylactic measure that
should be upheld for this specific class of potential contributors for whom the party-related corruption risk is obviously
heightened.
B. Party Soft Money
There have been nostalgic calls for the restoration of party
soft money since the BCRA banned it more than decade ago.
Even after the soft money ban was upheld in McConnell, the
Republican National Committee (RNC) persisted with unsuccessful constitutional challenges, the last one decided right
after Citizens United.230 However, the powerful signals from
the Roberts Court about its eagerness to reverse the course of
campaign finance law certainly gives new life to the restoration
of party soft money, whether by constitutional challenge or
congressional reversal.
The last major challenge to BCRA’s party soft money ban
was RNC v. FEC, decided just months after Citizens United in
2010.231 The D.C. District Court upheld the prohibition on the
national party committees from soliciting, receiving, or directing to another person any funds that are not subject to the
contribution limits, source restrictions, and disclosure requirements applicable to contributions under federal campaign finance law.232 Following Citizens United, commentators,
including myself, expected the soft money ban eventually to be
struck down,233 but the Supreme Court summarily affirmed,
229

See Issacharoff, supra note 212, at 141–42.
See RNC v. FEC, 698 F. Supp. 2d 150 (D.D.C. 2010), aff’d 130 S. Ct. 3544
(2010).
231
Id.
232
Id. at 160 (upholding the constitutionality of 2 U.S.C. § 441i(a)(1)).
233
See Kang, supra note 210, at 252–53 (anticipating challenges to restrictions on party soft money); Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Affirms a Ban on Soft
Money, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2010, http://nytimes.com/2010/06/30/us/politics
/30donate.html [https://perma.cc/SN62-7BAC] (quoting Richard Hasen’s dismissal of summary affirmance in RNC v. FEC as “only temporary good news for
those who think the soft-money ban is an important anticorruption component of
federal campaign finance law”); Nathaniel Persily, The Floodgates Were Already
Open, SLATE (Jan. 25, 2010, 2:30 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_
and_politics/jurisprudence/2010/01/the_floodgates_were_already_open.html

R

230
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perhaps unwilling to revisit so immediately the public controversy raised by Citizens United.234
The RNC offered a clever argument in its litigation that was
ultimately unsuccessful before the D.C. District Court but
nonetheless well crafted to the Roberts Court’s narrow approach to corruption. The RNC mounted an as-applied challenge disclaiming any use of federal candidates to solicit soft
money and any assistance to soft money donors “in obtaining
preferential access to federal candidates or officeholders.”235
Taken at face value, the RNC’s stipulation seemed calculated to
evade the Court’s rationale for upholding the BCRA soft money
ban in McConnell. There, the Court had predicated its ruling in
part on evidence that the parties had sold access to federal
officeholders and candidates in exchange for soft money donations, therefore implicating the government’s rightful interest
in preventing undue influence.236 But as the D.C. District
Court acknowledged, “[t]o the degree that the FEC argues that
large contributions to the national parties are corrupting and
can be limited because they create gratitude, facilitate access
to, or generate influence, Citizens United makes clear that
those theories are not viable.”237
Instead, the D.C. District Court upheld the soft money prohibition based on “the inherently close relationship between
parties and their officeholders and candidates.”238 It explained
that McConnell’s affirmation of the soft money prohibition did
not rest exclusively on a theory of access and undue influence,
but also was based on the Court’s determination that “there
was no meaningful separation between the national party committees and the public officials who control them, because the
national committees were run by, and largely composed of,
federal officeholders and candidates.”239 This “unity of interest” with the national parties, articulated in McConnell, meant
that “federal officeholders and candidates may value contribution to their national parties—regardless of how those contributions ultimately may be used—in much the same way they
[http://perma.cc/ZQ2B-SQR2] (“Given the tone of Citizens United, we should
expect a bold response [in RNC].”).
234
RNC v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 3544 (2010).
235
698 F. Supp. 2d at 155.
236
See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 153–54 (2003).
237
698 F. Supp. 2d at 158.
238
Id. at 159.
239
Id. at 159 (quoting McConnell, 540 U.S. at 155) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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value contributions to their own campaigns.”240 For this reason, even after Citizens United narrowed the government’s anticorruption interest, the D.C. District Court reasoned that
“contributions to national parties have much the same tendency as contributions to federal candidates to result in quid
pro quo corruption or at least the appearance of quid pro quo
corruption.”241
This reading of McConnell trades heavily in a group-level
understanding of quid pro quo corruption. The national party
committees were “inextricably intertwined with federal officeholders and candidates” because they were controlled by them
and aligned almost exclusively in service to them.242 As a result, there was no necessary distinction in kind, at least from
the standpoint of quid pro quo corruption, between exchanges
with the party committees and exchanges with the candidates
themselves. The D.C. District Court, though, was uncertain
about the robustness of its interpretation of McConnell. It explained that the “McConnell opinion is ambiguous on the question whether the ‘unity of interest’ between national parties and
their candidates and officeholders was an independently sufficient rationale for the Court to uphold the blanket ban on softmoney contributions.”243 As I explained earlier, the Court had
not embraced this “unity of interest” in the past. Indeed, the
bulk of the Court’s reasoning in McConnell focused less on
unity of interest than on the selling of access and resulting
undue influence of soft money donors. It is, nonetheless, this
slender reed from McConnell, based effectively on an aggregatelevel understanding of quid pro quo corruption, upon which
the party soft money ban may depend.
Justice Kennedy’s dissent in McConnell made no such concession about the potential for quid pro quo corruption
through party campaign finance. Justice Kennedy’s notion of
quid pro quo corruption depends on the existence of some exchange with the contributors, as opposed to expenditures that
simply benefit the candidate or officeholder without his or her
participation.244 For this reason, he restricted his opinion in
240

Id. (emphasis in original).
Id. (emphasis in original).
242
McConnell, 540 U.S. at 155 (quoting 148 CONG. REC. H409 (Feb. 13, 2002)
(statement of Rep. Shays)).
243
698 F. Supp. 2d at 160 (emphasis in original).
244
McConnell, 540 U.S. at 290 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (“The principal concern, of course, is the agreement for a quid pro quo
between officeholders (or candidates) and those who would seek to influence
them.”).
241
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Citizens United explicitly to the impermissibility of government
regulation of independent expenditures.245 Citizens United explicitly left open the question of the regulability of contributions to candidates and parties that, by definition, involved an
exchange or transfer of money.246 However, Justice Kennedy
has not made entirely clear the degree to which he believes
exchanges with party committees, as opposed to candidates
and officeholders themselves, potentially implicate a risk of
quid pro quo corruption. In McConnell itself, Justice Kennedy
was focused on blasting the majority’s ruling that access peddling by the parties constituted actionable quid pro quo corruption. In his view, the soft money ban “does not regulate
federal candidates’ or officeholders’ receipt of quids because it
does not regulate contributions to, or conduct by, candidates
or officeholders.”247 If this is correct, then Justice Kennedy is
unlikely to waver from the view that soft money does not raise a
corruption risk because in his judgment, it does not constitute
direct receipt of money by candidates or officeholders.
Although I maintain that party soft money regulations can
be constitutionally justified as a means of combating quid pro
quo corruption, preemptive legislative adjustment of restrictions on soft money might be a smart political concession nonetheless. Soft money, unlike so-called hard money, is restricted
in its permissible use by the recipient, whether it is a party
committee or otherwise.248 Soft money is collected outside the
usual strictures of the federal campaign regulation that apply
to hard money used to fund express advocacy.249 The FEC
originally authorized the collection of soft money for use mainly
on “party building” activity, including voter registration, getout-the-vote activities, and general administration, rather than
for federal electioneering.250 As such, the FEC considered soft
money spending for state and local election efforts as beyond
its regulatory authority over federal elections. Once authorized, though, the party national committees dramatically expanded their involvement with soft money during the 1990s,

245

Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 365–66 (2010).
Id. at 362.
247
McConnell, 540 U.S. at 299 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
248
See Briffault, supra note 56, at 628–31.
249
See id.
250
See Corrado, supra note 113, at 1030–34 (narrating the historical evolution of party soft money).
246

R
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both in sheer fundraising scale and utilization.251 The party
committees collected so much soft money to fund “sham issue
advertising” so closely resembling hard money electioneering
that Congress shut the door on soft money by passing BCRA in
2002.252 But the basic limitations on soft money leave it somewhat less useful than hard money for electioneering purposes
and channel its use toward party-building activity that advocates of strong parties should support, notwithstanding associated corruption concerns.
In other words, conditional legislative permission for the
national party committees to raise soft money from individuals
and coordinate with state and local parties along those lines
might be a useful, if limited form of party deregulation. To limit
the risk of corruption, deregulation of party soft money still
would need to sensibly segregate it from electioneering advocacy and subject it to donation limits. Donation limits on soft
money would be set above the hard money contribution limits
but provide an upper bound nonetheless against the excesses
of pre-BCRA soft money fundraising, especially if limited to
individuals and not extended to corporations and unions.253
So cabined, soft money raised for legitimate party-building expenses might bolster party strength and build up grassroots
infrastructure that seems to have eroded since BCRA’s passage, at least at the state and local party levels.254 Without
question, money is fungible and will find certain ways around
regulation, back toward the electioneering purposes that the
251
See Richard Briffault, The Future of Reform: Campaign Finance After the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1179, 1182–1183
(2002).
252
See Kang, supra note 7, at 3–4; see also Briffault, supra note 251, at
1182–85 (presenting the blueprint for BCRA regulation of party soft money).
253
See Raymond J. La Raja, Breaking Up the Party: How McConnell Downsizes Partisan Campaigns, 3 ELECTION L.J. 271, 274–75 (2004) (reporting that soft
money donors in 1998, before BCRA, averaged less in soft money donations than
hard money donors averaged in hard money contributions). However, a problem
with soft money before BCRA was that a small number of rich donors also donated
massive amounts of soft money as well. See Stephen Ansolabehere & James M.
Snyder, Jr., Soft Money, Hard Money, and Strong Parties, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 598,
607 (2000) (explaining that 18,000 different donors gave soft money in 1998 but
11% of them gave almost 80% of the aggregate total); Briffault, supra note 39, at
346 (reporting that approximately $300 million in soft money in 1999–2000 came
from just 800 donors).
254
See Andrias, supra note 153, at 48–50 (criticizing the “hollowed-out” parties and noting the larger absence of participatory institutions); Fishkin & Gerken,
supra note 90, at 204 (lamenting the deterioration of the parties’ role in democratic mobilization and engagement); Issacharoff, supra note 26, at 109–10 (arguing that state-level party infrastructure no longer exists and must be “created on
the fly” for national campaigns).

R

R
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major party committees currently prioritize. Before BCRA,
roughly 45% of party soft money went to issue advertising.255
This was the problem that BCRA was intended to address, even
at the cost of cutting off funds for party building. Still, roughly
55% of soft money went to pay for party-oriented activities such
as voter registration, get-out-the-vote drives, direct mail, telephone banks, administration, and fundraising expenses,
mainly at the state and local level.256 State and local parties,
which perform the bulk of this grassroots outreach, relied
heavily on soft money transfers from the national committees
before BCRA and have struggled without it.257
At a time when campaign finance law is already trending
quickly toward deregulation by Court mandate, a strategic concession that channels party campaign finance in a normative
preferable direction and retains important restrictions is worth
consideration. Party soft money presents a lesser risk of corruption if it can be regulated on sensible terms and directed
toward party mobilization and engagement of ordinary voters—
a mission they generally have increasingly neglected in pursuit
of bigger fish.258
C. Party Super PACs
Almost unnoticed in the daily news coverage of campaign
finance since Citizens United was the arrival of the first partysponsored Super PAC at the state level. It is surprising that
this development went overlooked by campaign finance law
commentators and practitioners, because party-sponsored
Super PACs, if protected by federal courts as a constitutional
matter, would represent the near total collapse of campaign
255
See Herbert Alexander, The Political Process After the Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act of 2002, 2 ELECTION L.J. 47, 47 (2003); Briffault, supra note 251, at
1185. What is more, soft money at the local level presents its own set of corruption concerns. See, e.g., N.Y. COMM’N TO INVESTIGATE PUB. CORRUPTION, PRELIMINARY
REPORT, Dec. 2, 2013, at 37–39 (discussing so-called party “housekeeping” accounts); COMMON CAUSE/N.Y., THE LIFE OF THE PARTY: HARD FACTS ON SOFT MONEY:
“HOUSEKEEPING” ACCOUNTS IN NEW YORK STATE, May 2013, at 13–26 (explaining that
“housekeeping” accounts at the state and local levels of New York State enable
wealthy special interest groups to influence elections and policymaking).
256
See Alexander, supra note 255, at 47; see also Ansolabehere & Snyder, Jr.,
supra note 253, at 617 (estimating quantitatively at the time that a federal soft
money ban would reduce national turnout more than two percentage points).
257
See Michael J. Malbin, McCutcheon Could Lead to No Limits for Political
Parties—With What Implications for Parties and Interest Groups, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV.
ONLINE 92, 99–100 (2014) (documenting the drop in state party financing since
BCRA).
258
See Kang, supra note 7, at 50–52 (discussing the major parties’ increasing
focus on high-level campaign finance at the expense of grassroots mobilization).
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finance law. A federal decision that the government cannot
require a party-sponsored Super PAC to abide by contribution
limits and source restrictions would very likely involve constitutional reasoning that leaves hardly anything of the campaign
finance system that existed before the Roberts Court. Such a
decision would leave in place only the bare core of that system—the basic regulation of candidate contributions and
disclosure.
How did we get our first party Super PAC at the state level?
In May 2014, the Colorado Republican Party established an
independent expenditure-only committee, commonly known as
a Super PAC, after a declaratory order from Secretary of State
Scott Gessler, a fellow Republican, opined to its legality under
state campaign finance law.259 The state party stipulated that
it would appoint the committee membership of the party Super
PAC, serve as the Super PAC’s parent corporation, require the
Super PAC to follow the party bylaws, and solicit funds for the
Super PAC.260 However, the state party promised that it would
not actively manage the Super PAC’s operations nor direct its
campaign spending, to avoid formal coordination with the
Super PAC and to preserve the independence of its expenditures.261 The Colorado Republican Party sued in state court for
a declaratory judgment under Colorado law and promptly won
summary judgment, unopposed by the state, for its Super PAC
to receive uncapped donations to fund independent
expenditures.262
The constitutional case for the party-sponsored Super PAC
is straightforward after Citizens United263 and SpeechNow.org
v. FEC.264 The Republican National Committee pressed the
same case at the federal level before abruptly withdrawing its
259
See Eli Stokols, Secretary of State: Colorado GOP Can Form Fundraising
Super PAC, FOX NEWS 31 (Feb. 6, 2014, 8:06 PM), http://kdvr.com/2014/02/06/
colorado-gop-gets-green-light-to-form-fundraising-super-pac/ [http://perma.cc/
V2XQ-W8BH]. It seems that the state party actually established an independent
expenditure-only committee more than a year earlier, in August 2012, on the
advice of Gessler. See Petition for Declaratory Order at 4, Matter of the Colo.
Republican Party’s Request for a Declaratory Order Concerning Party Indep. Expenditure Comms. (2013). The earlier committee, however, was funded entirely
by hard money transfers from the state party subject to applicable state law
restrictions, and thus enjoyed none of the regulatory advantages of a Super PAC
vis-à-vis a standard political committee that makes candidate contributions.
260
Order on Motion for Summary Judgment at 3–4, Colo. Republican Party v.
Gessler (D. Colo. Sept. 30, 2014) (No. 2014-CV-31851).
261
Id. at 4.
262
See id. at 5.
263
558 U.S. 310 (2010).
264
599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
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claims in RNC v. FEC for the time being. As the RNC argued in
that lawsuit, Citizens United established unequivocally that independent expenditures do not raise the specter of quid pro
quo corruption. Then, SpeechNow.org extended that logic to
strike down as unconstitutional contribution limits applicable
to nonconnected committees that use their campaign funding
exclusively to engage in their own independent expenditures.265 These Super PACs qualified for freedom from contribution limits because of their insulation from candidates and
the resulting absence of any quid pro quo risk that would justify restriction. The Republican National Committee claimed,
mirroring the Colorado Republican Party’s arguments, that
they deserve regulatory parity with nonconnected committees
provided it too ensures that its Super PAC refrains from engaging candidates with contributions and formal coordination.266
The RNC admitted that it would make contributions and coordinate with its candidates, but like nonconnected groups, it
promised to segregate its Super PAC fundraising and accounts
from its main operations out of which it would engage its
candidates.267
From the perspective of a group-level theory of quid pro
quo corruption, it would be absurd if the government could not
impose contribution limits upon a party-sponsored Super PAC
under these circumstances. It is simply astounding to suppose
that the Super PAC run by the national party committee is
meaningfully independent from the party itself, and that the
party’s candidates are entirely free from the associated risk of
corruption, because it operates out of a different pocket on the
same pair of pants. The RNC cannot credibly claim any meaningful insulation from its candidates given its pervasive connection to them as its reason for being. However, the RNC’s
claims draw life from the Court’s earlier decisions recognizing
the party committees’ constitutional right to engage in nominally independent expenditures. Those decisions, as the RNC
astutely cites, ruled that not even a party committee could be
presumptively regarded as coordinated with candidates to justify a special restriction on independent expenditures.268
265

See id. at 698.
See Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment
at 15–24, RNC v. FEC, No. 14-cv-853 (D.D.C. July 14, 2014) [hereinafter Memorandum in Support].
267
See id. at 3–4, 7 (citing SpeechNow.org, 599 F.3d at 696).
268
See Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 618
(1996).
266
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Under this logic, the RNC further proposed that its officials, themselves perhaps party candidates and officeholders,
can legally solicit on behalf of its Super PAC unrestricted contributions specifically earmarked for express advocacy in support of particular party candidates.269 The underlying logic of
the RNC’s claim was that party committees are entitled to the
same rights in campaign finance as nonconnected groups with
literally no relationship with any candidates or officeholders.270
The party’s pervasive connection to its candidates and officeholders, absent formal coordination, made no constitutional
difference in the analysis. If the requirement of formal coordination was substantively meaningful, its decisive importance
in the analysis might make more sense, but if there is anything
on which campaign finance observers can widely agree, it is
that the legal definition of formal coordination is entirely
opaque at the moment and laughably easy to circumvent such
as it currently stands.271
A federal constitutional decision that tracks the RNC’s case
for party-sponsored Super PAC is therefore an existential
threat to American campaign finance regulation. Such reasoning might restrict the government’s interest in campaign finance regulation to restrictions on direct contributions to
candidates for office, with little else beyond basic disclosure.
Only that fundamental core of campaign finance activity—hard
money donations received personally by candidates—is unmistakably within the government’s interest in preventing “quid
pro quo corruption” as the Roberts Court has defined it.272
269

See Memorandum in Support, supra note 266, at 6–14.
See id. at 17–29.
271
See generally DANIEL P. TOKAJI & RENATA E. B. STRAUSE, THE NEW SOFT
MONEY: OUTSIDE SPENDING IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 63–71 (2014) (discussing
the legal distinction between formal coordination and mere cooperation); Richard
Briffault, Coordination Reconsidered, 113 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 88, 92 (2013)
(“That spending by these [Super PACs in 2012] was considered legally independent of and not coordinated with the single candidates they support is proof
enough of the inadequacy of our current law to deal with the Super PAC phenomenon.”); see also VOGEL, supra note 8, at 86–96 (noting the toothlessness of federal
restrictions on coordination between Super PACs and candidate campaigns during the 2012 presidential primaries); Matea Gold, It’s Bold, but Legal: How Campaigns and Their Super PAC Backers Work Together, WASH. POST (July 6, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/here-are-the-secret-ways-superpacs-and-campaigns-can-work-together/2015/07/06/bda78210-1539-11e589f3-61410da94eb1_story.html [http://perma.cc/Y5EY-793L] (“The rules of affiliation are just about as porous as they can be, and it amounts to a joke that
there’s no coordination between these individual super PACs and the candidates.”
(quoting Rep. David Price)).
272
See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1444–45 (2014) (“The primary
purpose of FECA was to limit quid pro quo corruption and its appearance; that
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Down this path, the Roberts Court would have struck down
virtually all restriction of independent expenditures, regardless
of the spender’s identity—corporate, union, party, or otherwise—and would allow only the regulation of money literally
transferred to a candidate.
Once down this path, it would be hard to understand how
the government’s anticorruption interest could support some of
the current limits even on candidates, set as low as they are,
without justifying any other material restriction on campaign
finance activity. The FEC has long since denied permission for
a U.S. Senator’s leadership PAC to operate its own Super
PAC,273 but perhaps a judicial revisitation of that denial, deregulating even incumbent officeholders on a presumption of
independence from themselves, would truly be a final move in
the endgame of campaign finance law. Already in advance of
the 2016 presidential election, politicians who all but formally
declared their candidacies for their party’s presidential nomination managed to conduct their early campaign activities
through Super PACs.274 Another leap from this legal pretense
of noncoordination between prospective candidates and their
Super PACs, to open use of Super PACs by candidates for campaign purposes is not difficult to imagine.275
purpose satisfied the requirement of a ‘sufficiently important’ government interest.”); see also supra Part I.
273
See FEC Advisory Op. 2011–21 (Dec. 1, 2011) (concluding that the Constitutional Conservatives Fund PAC, sponsored by a U.S. Senator, must collect all
campaign funds subject to FECA regulation, including contribution limits and
source restrictions on corporations and unions, even for its independent
expenditures).
274
See Reid J. Epstein & Rebecca Ballhaus, Roles of Presidential Super PACs
Expanding, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 30, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/roles-ofpresidential-super-pacs-expanding-1430437766 [http://perma.cc/4ZW3-GHB
P]; Matea Gold, Why Super PACs Have Moved from Sideshow to Center Stage for
Presidential Hopefuls, WASH. POST (Mar. 12, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/politics/once-the-sideshows-super-pacs-now-at-the-forefront-of-presiden
tial-runs/2015/03/12/516d371c-c777-11e4-a199-6cb5e63819d2_story.html
[https://perma.cc/8H83-CWK2].
275
See Nicholas Confessore, Democrats Lay Groundwork to Expand Use of
‘Super PACs’, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2015, at A1 (reporting plans to tighten relationship of Super PAC activity with candidates’ formal campaigns); Trip Gabriel,
‘Super PACs’ Take on New Role, Organizing Voters, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2015, at
A1–A2 (reporting increasing use of Super PACs for traditional grassroots fieldwork); Joseph Tanfani & Seema Mehta, Super PACs Stretch the Rules that Prohibit
Coordination with Presidential Campaigns, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2015, http://
www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-politics-superpacs-impact-20151005-story.html
[http://perma.cc/KZ8C-W389] (describing aggressive use of Super PACs for 2016
presidential primary campaigning); Paul Blumenthal, How Super PACs and Campaigns Are Coordinating in 2016, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 14, 2015)
www.huffingtonpost.com/super-pac-cordination_us_5643f85e46045bf3def0273
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IV
PARTY AS COUNTERWEIGHT, OR PARTY CO-OPTATION?
A pivotal question in campaign finance law today is what to
do, if anything, about party-related campaign finance. As I
have argued, there is a discernible constitutional path for the
continued regulation of party-related campaign finance, at
least over the longer term, even under the current Court’s doctrinal emphasis on quid pro quo corruption. But if the doctrinal case for a group-level theory of quid pro quo corruption is
only prospective and tentative, the main threat to the regulation of party campaign finance might yet be normative resistance on policy, rather than constitutional grounds. Today, the
normative case for the regulation of party campaign finance,
even in its current longstanding form, is perhaps less certain
than ever.
A.

The Normative Case for Party Deregulation in the Super
PAC Era

There is greater political resistance to the regulation of
party-related campaign finance than there has been in quite a
while, perhaps since Buckley. The case against the regulation
of party-related campaign finance extends beyond the usual
normative brief in favor of parties, described earlier, as critical
mechanisms for interest aggregation that simplify politics and
enable democratic accountability. It seizes upon the unraveling of the campaign finance system under the Roberts Court,
whose narrowing scope of permissible regulation has fed a
surge of campaign finance money flowing to outside groups,
such as nonconnected Super PACs and 501(c) organizations.276 In the wake of court decisions deregulating campaign
finance, outside groups now face significantly fewer restrictions than candidate and party committees who are still encumbered by the full regulatory panoply of contribution limits,
source restrictions, and disclosure requirements. Super PACs,
for instance, may not contribute to candidates and party committees, but if they restrict their campaign finance activity to
independent expenditures, then they can fund their independent expenditures with unrestricted contributions from not
[https://perma.cc/UB4Z-9WEV] “The role of single-candidate super PACs has
expanded exponentially in the 2016 presidential campaign.”).
276
See Michael S. Kang, The Year of the Super PAC, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1902, 1907–13 (2013) (noting the rapid development of Super PACs following
Citizens United).
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only individuals, but also from corporations and unions.277
501(c) organizations ostensibly cannot contribute to candidates and party candidates, nor make campaigning their “major purpose.” As such, they can claim not to qualify as
regulated political committees under campaign finance law and
therefore make independent expenditures without restriction,
not even subject to basic campaign finance disclosure
requirements.278
The differential regulation between candidates and party
committees on the one hand, and nonconnected outside
groups on the other hand, creates certain incentives for the
direction of money toward nonconnected outside groups that
face far less regulation. Campaign money in politics is fungible
and tends to adapt to its regulation by finding less regulated
outlets, like water finding its own level. This hydraulics of campaign finance suggests that new regulation complicates the
flow of campaign finance money but often only channels the
flow of money in different directions, through different recipients, rather than cutting off the flow of money altogether.279
Although the hydraulics of campaign finance have certainly
played out with respect to new regulation like BCRA, the subsequent deregulation of campaign finance during the Roberts
Court has produced what I have described as the “reverse hydraulics” of campaign finance.280 As campaign finance regulation has been peeled back recently, money has been channeled
toward new opportunities opened up by the removal of those
former legal restrictions.
After Roberts Court decisions cleared the way for the deregulation of outside groups sticking to independent expenditures,281 gushers of money flowed to newly created Super PACs
in a matter of months for the 2010 elections.282 Eighty-three
newly minted Super PACs quickly raised more than $60 million
for the 2010 elections.283 What is more, election spending by
277
See Briffault, supra note 141, at 1646–47 (discussing the characteristics of
Super PACs and how they differ from other campaign finance vehicles).
278
See Richard Briffault, Two Challenges for Campaign Finance Disclosure
After Citizens United and Doe v. Reed, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 983, 1007–08
(2011).
279
See Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign
Finance Reform, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1708–17 (1999).
280
See Kang, supra note 7, at 40–44.
281
See Kang, supra note 276, at 1904–14.
282
See id. at 1907.
283
See 2010 Outside Spending, by Group, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS (2010),
https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2010&disp=
O&type=&chrt=P [http://perma.cc/2VQ4-L2GR]; see also Kang, supra note 276,
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all outside groups, including 501(c) organizations, increased
dramatically from nearly $70 million for the previous midterm
elections in 2006 to more than $300 million for 2010.284 By
2012, these trends only accelerated. Outside groups raised
and spent more than $1 billion for the 2012 elections, with
roughly 1310 Super PACs raising more than $800 million and
accounting for more than $600 million of the total spending.285
For this reason, a growing chorus of prominent commentators are now arguing for the deregulation of party campaign
finance as a counterweight to the ascent of these well-funded
outside groups.286 The basic argument is that the reverse hydraulics feeding campaign finance money to outside groups
can be undone by deregulating the major parties from their
current contribution limits and other restrictions. If campaign
finance money is currently directed to Super PACs and 501(c)
organizations because they are differentially less regulated
than the formal party committees, then the deregulation of the
party committees ought to induce a redirection of that money
back to the parties. What is more, such a redirection of money
to the major parties would reinvigorate the parties and candidates vis-à-vis the growing power of outside groups in campaign finance. Newly invigorated parties could counterbalance
the ideological influence of these outside groups.
It is certainly true that the “party” can be conceptualized at
vastly different levels of generality. The party writ large is a
broad, far flung coalition of political actors that includes not
at 1907 (commenting on the amount of money raised by Super PACs leading up to
the 2010 election).
284
See Total Outside Spending by Election Cycle, Excluding Party Committees,
CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS (2012), https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespend
ing/cycle_tots.php [http://perma.cc/M53S-28RA].
285
See 2012 Outside Spending, by Super PAC, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS
(2012), https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2012&
chrt=V&type=S [http://perma.cc/DGE4-L24K].
286
See Nathaniel Persily, Strengthening Parties as a Solution to Polarization, in
SOLUTIONS TO POLITICAL POLARIZATION IN AMERICA 126–28 (Nathaniel Persily ed.,
2015); Raymond J. La Raja, Campaign Finance and Partisan Polarization in the
United States, 9 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 223, 236–37 (2014); Richard H.
Pildes, Romanticizing Democracy, Political Fragmentation, and the Decline of American Government, 124 YALE L.J. 804, 836–45 (2014); Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos,
Aligning Campaign Finance Law, 101 VA. L. REV. 1425, 1425 (2015); Ray La Raja
& Brian Schaffner, Want to Reduce Polarization? Give Parties More Money, WASH.
POST (July 21, 2014), http://washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/
2014/07/21/want-to-reduce-polarization-give-parties-more-money/ [http://
perma.cc/R5XA-QQRN]; see also PETER J. WALLISON & JOEL M. GORA, BETTER PARTIES, BETTER GOVERNMENT: A REALISTIC PROGRAM FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM
52–57 (2009) (suggesting that eliminating restrictions on party campaign finance
creates a more level political playing field).
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only the formal party committees, officeholders, and candidates, but high-level party donors, party-allied interest groups,
intellectual leaders and pundits, and even grassroots volunteers and sympathetic voters.287 This broadest conception of
the party writ large as a sprawling network certainly includes
outside groups such as Super PACs and 501(c) organizations
aligned with one major party or the other.288 But commentators in favor of deregulating the major parties in campaign
finance are focused narrowly on the “party” as represented by
the formal party campaign finance entities, mainly the national
party committees, and perhaps leadership PACs, and a few
other types of party vehicles thoroughly regulated under federal campaign finance law.289 Deregulation could take various
forms, from substantially higher contribution limits, to the
reintroduction of party soft money, to party-sponsored Super
PACs that could collect uncapped money from individuals, corporations, and unions for independent expenditures.
This distinction between the formal party committees and
the party writ large is still a meaningful one. The former are
directly controlled by the party leadership, while the broader
party is a polyphonic network in which intraparty contestation
over the party’s political direction occurs among a diversity of
players.290 Worry about the rise of outside groups stems from
the groups’ centripetal influence within this intraparty contestation for control. When there is little or no intraparty contestation about the party’s immediate goals, as during a general
election, the broad party network unites across its diverse
membership, from the party leadership to outside groups,
against the common enemy. But when the party is politically
divided, as during primary elections or over particular policymaking questions, Super PACs and 501(c) organizations can

287
See, e.g., Paul S. Herrnson, The Roles of Party Organizations, Party-Connected Committees, and Party Allies in Elections, 71 J. POL. 1207, 1209-16 (2009)
(describing this multilayered composition of the party coalition).
288
See Kang, supra note 276, at 1923-27; see also SETH MASKET, CTR. FOR
EFFECTIVE PUB. MGMT. AT BROOKINGS INST., MITIGATING EXTREME PARTNERSHIP IN AN ERA
OF NETWORKED PARTIES: AN EXAMINATION OF VARIOUS REFORM STRATEGIES 3 (Mar.
2014), (characterizing the broader party as a “polycephalous creature with ambiguous boundaries” (citing Michael Heaney et al., Polarized Networks: The Organizational Affiliations of National Party Convention Delegates, 56 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST.
1654, 1654–76 (2012)).
289
See Kang, supra note 140, at 133–35.
290
See Kathleen Bawn et al., A Theory of Political Parties: Groups, Policy Demands, and Nominations in American Politics, 10 PERSP. POL. 571, 572–75 (2012).
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fuel party dissension, exacerbate polarization, and fracture the
formal party leadership’s influence.291
Richard Pildes champions the re-assertion of party leadership in an endowed lecture at Yale Law School published by the
Yale Law Journal.292 Pildes urges an institutionally and organizationally centered focus on “how political power gets mobilized, gets organized, and functions (or breaks down).”293 In
this spirit, he argues that polarized fragmentation of the major
parties is a crippling feature of today’s national politics and
asks “from where are sources of compromise and negotiation,
deal-making, pragmatism, and the like most likely to emerge in
such an overall polarized structure?”294 His answer is the
party leadership.
Drawing upon political science, Pildes contends that party
leaders tend to be ideological middlemen with internalized incentives to broaden the electoral appeal of their parties and
broker effective governance across party lines.295 However,
across a landscape of fragmented, polarized party politics,
Pildes observes that “party leaders can play this role only if
they have the tools and leverage to bring along their caucuses
in the direction that [they] believe best positions the party as a
whole.”296 For this reason, he approves of the McCutcheon decision and proposes a further deregulation of party-related
campaign finance by removing restrictions from coordination
between party spending and candidates and significantly raising contribution limits on party committees.297 He claims that
291
See Kang, supra note 276, at 1919–27 (explaining these dynamics and
describing the role of Super PACs in the 2012 Republican primaries as illustration); see also Nicholas Confessore, G.O.P. Donors Seek Early Call On ‘16 Nominee,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 8, 2014), at A1 (discussing the Republican Party’s efforts to avoid
a Super PAC-driven party split in 2016).
292
Pildes, supra note 166, at 836–45. Pildes, however, does not believe that
any fundraising and spending shift to outside groups has occurred as a result of a
reverse hydraulic reaction to the Court’s campaign finance decisions. Id. at
839–41.
293
Id. at 807.
294
Id. at 831–32.
295
Id. at 832; see also GARY W. COX & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, LEGISLATIVE
LEVIATHAN: PARTY GOVERNMENT IN THE HOUSE 115–24 (2nd ed. 2007) (finding that
party leaders internalize the party’s collective interests); D. RODERICK KIEWIET &
MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE LOGIC OF DELEGATION: CONGRESSIONAL PARTIES AND THE
APPROPRIATION PROCESS 47–55 (1991) (arguing that “potential agency losses are
greatest when leaders’ preferences are extreme or idiosyncratic”); DAVID TRUMAN,
THE CONGRESSIONAL PARTY 65–72, 82–91 (1959) (exploring congressional voting
behavior).
296
Pildes, supra note 166, at 833.
297
Id. at 836–45. Pildes separately also appears to support party Super PACs,
discussed infra. See Richard Pildes, Can Political party Super PACs Reduce Polari-
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parties donate twice as much to centrist candidates than to
ideological extreme ones and thus are “a force for moderation
compared to individual contributions,” which are ideologically
motivated and highly polarized.298
I too have championed the role of the formal party leadership,299 and without question, the reverse hydraulics of campaign finance toward outside groups, and away from
candidates and their party committees, has been normatively
unfortunate in my view.300 Candidates and parties, not
outside groups, appear on the ballot. They, not outside groups,
are accountable to voters through elections and have the
proper incentives to be responsible and truthful, even if those
incentives do not always win out. Candidates and parties face
the voters’ periodic judgment and need to win public approval,
but for democratic accountability, candidates and parties must
be empowered to publicly define, articulate, and defend their
agendas. For all these reasons, a campaign finance system
that channels money to outside groups fragments politics and
distracts from a proper focus on candidates and the major
parties, just as Pildes and others argue.
B. Co-optation over Counterweight
The question now is whether deregulation of party campaign finance will enable the major parties to serve as a counterweight to outside groups and other sources of party
fragmentation, or whether the influx of new campaign money
from the donor class will further co-opt the parties. Any theory
that deregulation will boost the formal party leadership’s influence assumes that deregulation leads to the formal party committees collecting and spending more campaign finance money.
The questions are where that new money comes from and
whether increased contributions from those sources affects
how the parties subsequently behave. It would be one thing if
we could assume the parties will receive new money from new
sources indifferent to its use and thus allow the parties to
deploy it freely as the parties wish. But such an unrealistic
assumption violates the overarching premise that campaign
zation?, WASH. POST (Sept. 26, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/
monkey-cage/wp/2014/09/26/can-political-party-super-pacs-reduce-polariza
tion [http://perma.cc/3JEK-WZ5N].
298
Pildes, supra note 166, at 829.
299
See Kang, supra note 140, at 160–70; Kang, supra note 7, at 44–52.
300
See Kang, supra note 7, at 44–52; Kathleen M. Sullivan, Two Concepts of
Freedom of Speech, 124 HARV. L. REV. 143, 169 (2010) (criticizing the post-Citizens
United multiplication of outside groups as a “dystopian universe”).
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finance contributors, whether parties or individuals, care
about how the money is used and thoughtfully deploy their
money to achieve their strategic aims. If we assume that under
deregulation the parties will strategically use new campaign
finance money to gain greater leverage over their candidates
and achieve certain ideological ends, we ought also to expect,
one step further back, that the original sources of the parties’
new money also will gain greater leverage over the parties.
Most, though not all,301 of the proposed deregulation of
party campaign finance would encourage the major parties to
rely even more heavily on their wealthiest donors for financial
support.302 For instance, deregulation that legalizes a party
Super PAC, or party soft money once again, allows parties to
collect campaign money in larger chunks, beyond the current
base limits, almost exclusively from very wealthy donors. So
too is the basic advantage from higher contribution limits for
party-related vehicles, and the elimination of the aggregate
limit under McCutcheon.303 There are exceptions. Loosening
regulations on party coordinated spending with candidates and
public financing through party committees would free up party
campaign finance without necessarily removing restrictions on
receiving money from wealthy donors.304 Another proposal is
raising limits on the party committees’ own contributions to
their candidates, which at least one study associates with
lower polarization at the state legislative level.305 Apart from
those spending-side exceptions, though, many of proposals for
301
There are exceptions to this pattern. See infra notes 304–05 and accompanying text.
302
This has already been the case with respect to looser restrictions on party
fundraising under the new Cromnibus campaign finance rules. See Matea Gold &
Tom Hamburger, Political Parties Go After Million-Dollar Donors in Wake of Looser
Rules, WASH. POST (Sept. 19, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/
political-parties-go-after-million-dollar-donors-in-wake-of-looser-rules/2015/
09/19/728b43fe-5ede-11e5-8e9e-dce8a2a2a679_story.html [https://perma.cc/
CTG4-WPTR].
303
See, e.g., Matea Gold, Wealthy Political Donors Seize on New Latitude to
Give to Unlimited Candidates, WASH. POST (Sept. 2, 2014), http://www.washing
tonpost.com/politics/wealthy-political-donors-seize-on-new-latitude-to-give-tounlimited-candidates/2014/09/01/d94aeefa-2f8c-11e4-bb9b-997ae96fad33_
story.html [http://perma.cc/3JEK-WZ5N] (reporting that more than 300 individuals had contributed more than the former aggregate limit, through August 2014,
for a combined total of $50.2 million from those individuals up to that point).
304
See Pildes, supra note 166, at 833–45 (supporting both ideas); Lee E.
Goodman, A Time to Revive the Party, WASH. EXAMINER, Nov. 16, 2015 (arguing for
loosening restrictions on party grassroots activity and coordination with candidates without supporting deregulation of party fundraising).
305
See RAYMOND J. LA RAJA & BRIAN F. SCHAFFNER, CAMPAIGN FINANCE AND POLITICAL POLARIZATION: WHEN PURISTS PREVAIL 85–86 (2015).
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party deregulation simply allow the parties to collect money in
bigger chunks and thus encourage parties to depend even more
on their wealthiest donors than they already do.306
The closest current approximation of a party-sponsored
Super PAC is the Senate Majority PAC, which is operated by
former senior staffers of Democratic Senate leader Harry
Reid.307 Senate Majority PAC spent more than $44 million for
the 2014 midterm elections, $19.3 million of which came in
individual contributions of at least $500,000, including a
$5 million contribution from Tom Steyer and $4 million contribution from Fred Eychaner.308 Senate Majority PAC’s average
contribution, including all donors, was $170,525, which far
exceeded the average American household income of
$73,000.309 The Super PAC’s defining advantage over the garden-variety political committee is its legal capacity to accept
unlimited donations from the very rich. Super PAC campaign
finance is a rich man’s game, relying almost entirely on the
generosity of ultra-wealthy men as their reason for being. Of
more than $600 million raised by Super PACs in the 2014
federal election cycle, roughly a third came from just forty-two
individuals who averaged more than $1 million in Super PAC
donations for a midterm election.310 Tom Steyer alone donated
a total of almost $74 million to Super PACs for the 2014 elec306
A recent actual example of such deregulation is the so-called Cromnibus
Bill that increased the maximum amount an individual can contribute to each
national party’s three committees to $1.5 million over a federal election cycle. See
Hannah Hess, Campaign Finance Provisions Causing ‘Cromnibus’ Heartburn, ROLL
CALL (Dec. 10, 2014), http://blogs.rollcall.com/hill-blotter/campaign-financeprovisions-causing-cromnibus-heartburn/ [http://perma.cc/LQK2-Q27L].
307
See Pildes, supra note 166, at 842–43 (praising Super Majority PAC as a
provisional surrogate for a Super PAC run directly by the Democratic Party).
308
See Matea Gold, Top Harry Reid Advisers Build Big-Money Firewall to Protect Senate Democrats, WASH. POST (Sept. 16, 2014), http://
www.washingtonpost.com/politics/top-harry-reid-advisers-build-big-money-fire
wall-to-protect-sentate-democrats/2014/09/16991381b6-3cdf-11e4-95875dafd96295f0_story.html [http://perma.cc/C8H6-JCXH]; Steve Tetreault, Reid
Has Plenty at Stake in Election, LAS VEGAS REV. J., Nov. 1, 2014, http://
www.reviewjournal.com/politics/elections/reid-has-plenty-stake-election [http:/
/perma.cc/WX6Q-6CGD].
309
See Ian Vandewalker, Outside Spending and Dark Money in Toss-Up Senate
Races: Post-election Update, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE 2–3 (Nov. 10, 2014) https:/
/www.brennancenter.org/analysis/outside-spending-and-dark-money-toss-sen
ate-races-post-election-update [http://perma.cc/9N7N-F4EQ].
310
See Fredreka Schouten & Christopher Shnaars, Mega-influence: These 42
Dominate Super PAC Donations, USA TODAY (Oct. 29, 2014), http://www.usato
day.com/sotry/news/politics/2014/10/28/top-super-pac-donors-of-the-mid
terms-steyer-bloomber-singer-mercer/18060219/ [http://perma.cc/PS9HEKUH]. The article notes that only one female donor gave more than $2 million to
Super PACs last cycle, former Senate candidate Linda McMahon. Id.
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tions.311 It is no surprise then that the share of all campaign
contributions made by the top .01% of the voting-age population has more than quadrupled over the past thirty years to
more than 40%.312
The hope that deregulating party campaign finance will
reduce partisan polarization rests on a faith that the party
leadership would resist the influence of these wealthy donors
more than wealthy donors are able to redirect the leadership’s
priorities in the same process. The party leadership, through
their party committees, would draw their new revenue from the
same donor class that has funded the proliferation of outside
groups in campaign finance and any resulting polarization
from this decentralization of party politics.313 Individual contributors who comprise the donor class are overwhelmingly
wealthy and motivated by ideology in their campaign finance
activity. While business groups tend to be motivated by access
and donate to both parties, individual contributors donate almost exclusively to one major party, are themselves ideologically extreme, and contribute to candidates who are similarly
extreme ideologically.314 These wealthy contributors who are
ideologically motivated and help fuel polarization through their
campaign financing are the only individuals meaningfully affected by most imaginable forms of party deregulation.315 The
primary purpose of most forms of deregulation is to facilitate
very large, effectively uncapped contributions from these few
individuals who can afford large donations for political causes

311
See Katia Savchuk, Billionaire Tom Steyer on Money in Politics, Spending
$74 M on the Election, FORBES (Nov. 3, 2014), http://onforb.es/1A5xS2R [http://
perma.cc/PPN5-6L5U].
312
See Adam Bonica et al., Why Hasn’t Democracy Slowed Rising Inequality?,
27 J. ECON. PERSP. 103, 112, fig. 5 (2013).
313
See Choma, supra note 85 (reporting that 2014 featured the most campaign spending ever for a federal midterm election but a decline in the total
number of individual donors, which produced the highest all-time average individual contribution amount).
314
See Bonica, supra note 124, at 301–07; Lee Drutman, Are the 1% of the 1%
Pulling Politics in a Conservative Direction?, SUNLIGHT FOUND. (June 26, 2013, 8:15
AM), http://sunlightfoundation.com/blow/2013/06/26/1pct_of_the_1pct_polari
zation/ [https://perma.cc/46U9-3UVU]; Michael Barber, Ideological Donors, Contribution Limits, and the Polarization of State Legislatures 21–28 (Jan. 30, 2015)
(unpublished manuscript) [https://perma.cc/JFL7-2SFD].
315
See, e.g., Clyde Wilcox et al., With Limits Raised, Who Will Give More?: The
Impact of BCRA on Individual Donors, in LIFE AFTER REFORM: WHEN THE BIPARTISAN
CAMPAIGN REFORM ACT MEETS POLITICS 61, 69–79 (Michael J. Malbin ed., 2003)
(reporting the ideological motivations of the wealthy donors effected by regulation
of party campaign finance).
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well beyond the wherewithal of most Americans.316 What is
more, any current changes to party campaign finance along
these lines would occur at the very moment that this donor
class has become more assertive in its control of its money for
ideological, as opposed to straightforwardly partisan
purposes.317
The deregulation of party-related campaign finance may
only accelerate this ongoing distributional and ideological
lurch in American campaign finance toward the concentrated
interests of the very wealthy. Deregulation of party-related
campaign finance today would occur in a campaign finance
system that has already been thoroughly deregulated, where
fundraising and spending have already skyrocketed, and where
the influence wielded by wealthy donors is unprecedented
since Buckley. It is difficult to overstate the surging importance of very wealthy donors in this rapidly evolving system
already skewed so far in favor of their interests. Martin Gilens,
Larry Bartels, and a number of other political scientists have
compellingly documented the extent to which the political system is almost singularly responsive to the stratified preferences
of the richest Americans over their fellow citizens of ordinary
means.318 Gilens and Benjamin Page recently summarized
these findings by concluding “economic elites and organized
interest groups . . . play a substantial part in affecting public
policy, but the general public has little or no independent influence.”319 The overwhelming density of empirical findings make
it difficult not to believe the political system is tilting precipitously toward the preferences of the wealthy. Old patronageoriented parties spread their political spoils across wide party
316
The first contributors to take advantage of the expanded opportunities to
donate to the party committees under the Cromnibus provisions included Shelden Adelson, David Koch, and Henry Kravis. See Kenneth P. Doyle, Big GOP
Donors Giving to New Accounts Congress Created to Help Political Parties, BNA
DAILY REP., May 26, 2015, at A-6.
317
See Thomas B. Edsall, Billionaires Going Rogue, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2012),
http://campaignstops.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/28/billionaires-goingrogue/ [http://perma.cc/5WSN-GTHL]; Jim Rutenberg, Money Talks, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 19, 2014, at 30-32.
318
See LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE
NEW GILDED AGE 257–65 (2008); MARTIN GILENS, AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE: ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND POLITICAL POWER IN AMERICA (2012); JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL
PIERSON, WINNER-TAKE-ALL POLITICS: HOW WASHINGTON MADE THE RICH RICHER—AND
TURNED ITS BACK ON THE MIDDLE CLASS (2010); see also Nicholas Stephanopoulos,
Aligning Campaign Finance, 101 VA. L. REV. 1425, 1425 (2015) (summarizing this
literature and proposing campaign finance law be directed toward aligning policymaking with public opinion).
319
Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics:
Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens, 12 PERSP. ON POL. 564, 572 (2014).
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bases, but today’s campaign finance-oriented parties appear to
concentrate their returns near the very top of the economic
pyramid, where it is least needed. Whatever the role of campaign finance law in setting political responsiveness, the additional removal of restrictions on party campaign finance may
just accelerate the effects of Super PACs and other forms of
deregulation in multiplying the political capacity of the very
rich and their polarizing tendencies.320
For this reason, it is not clear that campaign finance deregulation would reduce partisan polarization or encourage ideological moderation, even if those are the desired aims.321 The
political science is ambivalent so far on whether party leadership are actually ideological middlemen as Pildes argues or,
instead, are more extreme than their party median.322 Because
individual donors are ideologically motivated and highly polarized, party officeholders who are themselves ideologically ex320
See Nicholas Confessore & Jonathan Martin, G.O.P. Race Starts in Lavish
Haunts of Rich Donors, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/
2015/03/01/us/politics/gop-race-starts-in-lavish-haunts-of-rich-donors.html
[http://perma.cc/X4PC-DLFL] (arguing that wealthy donors today have “the kind
of influence and convening power once held by urban political bosses and party
chairmen” in the presidential nomination process); Rutenberg, supra note 317, at
30–33, 51, 53.
321
See THOMAS E. MANN & ANTHONY CORRADO, CTR. FOR EFFECTIVE PUB. MGMT. AT
BROOKINGS INST., PARTY POLARIZATION AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE, 17 (2014); Fishkin &
Gerken, supra note 142, at 39–46.
322
Compare Pildes, supra note 166, at 832 (arguing that party leadership
comprises ideological middlemen), with Bernard Grofman et al., Congressional
Leadership 1965–96: A New Look at the Extremism Versus Centrality Debate, 27
LEGIS. STUD. Q. 87, 98 (2002) (“[P]arty leaders (in both parties) tend to be drawn
from the part of the ideological spectrum where the greatest concentration of their
members lies, the area beyond the median toward the party mode.”); see also Eric
Heberlig et al., The Price of Leadership: Campaign Money and the Polarization of
Congressional Parties, 68 J. POL. 992, 993–95 (2006) (“[B]oth the elected leadership itself and the farm system for elected leaders are increasingly populated by
ideologues.”); A.J. McGann et al., Why Party Leaders Are More Extreme than Their
Members: Modeling Sequential Elimination Elections in the U.S. House of Representatives, 113 PUB. CHOICE 337, 351–52 (2002) (finding that “party leaders tend
to be more extreme than their median members . . . .”). For a neutral assessment,
see Douglas B. Harris & Garrison Nelson, Middlemen No More? Emergent Patterns
in Congressional Leadership Selection, 41 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 49, 51 (2008)
(noting that leaders from the 107th to 110th Congress were equally likely to be
middlemen as they were extremists); Stephen Jessee & Neil Malhotra, Are Congressional Leaders Middlepersons or Extremists? Yes, 35 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 361,
380–84 (2010) (finding that elected leaders are usually close to their party’s ideological median but also display extremist tendencies). See also Stephanie Stamm,
Paul Ryan Would Be the Most Conservative House Speaker in Recent History, NAT’L
J. (Oct. 21, 2015), https://www.nationaljournal.com/s/91166/paul-ryan-wouldbe-most-conservative-house-speaker-recent-history [https://perma.cc/L43G2FSC] (reporting that new House Speaker Paul Ryan has the most polarized DWNOMINATE score among the last eleven speakers and ranks in the top quintile for
conservatism in the House).
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treme enjoy increasing advantages in fundraising and therefore
exercise growing leverage because of their financial resources.323 One study even contends that this fundraising advantage actually imparts an edge to ideologues when it comes
to party leadership selection, particularly as the emphasis on
fundraising increases.324 Ideologues in party leadership have
incentives not only to broaden the party’s mainstream appeal,
which does not seem the current priority of the Republican
Party,325 but are also charged with actualizing the median preferences of their polarized, increasingly cohesive caucuses as a
matter of conditional party government.326 Leadership devices
such as the Hastert Rule help ensure that the majority party
sticks together cohesively to advance the party’s median preferences and blocks opportunities for a bipartisan legislative majority to cohere and win out.327 In this alternative telling, party
polarization may have increased not because party leadership
is weak right now, but perhaps because the party leadership
represents ideologically cohesive, historically extreme
caucuses and simply reflects the strength of those preferences
toward increasingly polarized positions.328 This dynamic could
be exacerbated by divided government, which makes party ac323
See Michael J. Ensley, Individual Campaign Contributions and Candidate
Ideology, 138 PUB. CHOICE 221, 227 (2009) (finding that Republican and Democratic candidates could raise more money if they deviated from their respective
parties’ ideological centers); Heberlig et al., supra note 322; Bertram Johnson,
Individual Contributions: A Fundraising Advantage for the Ideologically Extreme?,
38 AM. POL. RES. 890, 903–06 (2010) (noting the advantages candidates can obtain from appealing to ideologically extreme individual donors); Walter J. Stone &
Elizabeth N. Simas, Candidate Valence and Ideological Positions in U.S. House
Elections, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 371, 380–82 (2010) (finding that candidates have an
electoral incentive to move ideologically away from their districts and speculating
that this finding is linked to campaign contributions by ideologically extreme
individual contributors).
324
See Heberlig et al., supra note 322, at 1002–04.
325
See generally THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, IT’S EVEN WORSE THAN
IT LOOKS: HOW THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM COLLIDED WITH THE NEW POLITICS
OF EXTREMISM 51–59 (2012) (criticizing the Republican Party’s rightward shift and
developing this argument).
326
See DAVID W. ROHDE, PARTIES AND LEADERS IN THE POSTREFORM HOUSE 105
(1991).
327
See generally Holly Fechner, Managing Political Polarization in Congress: A
Case Study on the Use of the Hastert Rule, 2014 UTAH L. REV. 757, 764–66
(explaining that the Hastert Rule contributed to polarization and increased the
ideological influence of the Tea Party).
328
See MANN & CORRADO, supra note 321, at 14 (“Parties today are strong in
the electorate, strong in their vast organizational networks, and strong in government.”); see also id. at 18 (“Inadequate resources are among the least important
problems facing party leaders in Congress on either side of the aisle.”). It may be
that advocates of stronger party leadership today are simply nostalgic for bygone
post-war bipartisanship that was itself historically exceptional. See Hahrie Han &
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countability even more difficult for independent voters to sort
out.329 As a result, how well deregulation of party campaign
finance plays out in practice is a little difficult to predict and
probably quite sensitive to the details.330
Even if deregulation of party campaign finance assigns the
right balance of power among party actors, it neglects distributional equality concerns that were once a main focus of campaign finance policymaking.331 Progressive and Democratic
Party attention to equality concerns lost some currency in legal
and political circles over the past twenty years as Democrats
established rough parity with Republicans in campaign finance
over the same period.332 As a result, many commentators dismissed anxiety about Super PACs during the 2012 elections
because it did not swing election outcomes one way or the other
between the two major parties. Partisan advantage, or the lack
of any, was a popular focus of attention, rather than the fact
that very wealthy donors played an unprecedented role in the
year of the Super PAC.333 Greater comfort among Democrats
about big-money campaign finance has split traditional progressive support for regulation, which was once nearly uniform, and fed skepticism about prioritizing distributional
concerns over intraparty and interparty balance of power.334
Today’s Democrats are divided between traditional progressives who worry about campaign finance and support its regulation, and centrist Democrats who are comfortable with
David W. Brady, A Delayed Return to Historical Norms: Congressional Party Polarization After the Second World War, 37 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 505, 507–12 (2007).
329
See Morris P. Fiorina, An Era of Divided Government, 107 POL. SCI. Q. 387,
408 (1992) (“In obscuring responsibility for government actions and the results
thereof, divided control exacerbates the already serious problems of responsibility
that are inherent in American politics.”).
330
See MASKET, supra note 288, at 13 (“[T]here is little reason to believe that a
change in the campaign finance system would substantially hurt or help parties
or change the voting behavior of the politicians they nominate.”).
331
See Bruce E. Cain, Reasoning to Desired Outcomes: Making Sense of McConnell v. FEC, 3 ELECTION L.J. 217, 219 (2004) (“It has long been my opinion that
a campaign finance reform without an open acknowledgement of equity considerations is inadequate.” (footnote omitted)).
332
See, e.g., Peter Olsen-Phillips, Revenge of the Democrats: Wealthy Liberals
Top List of Super PAC Donors in 2014, SUNLIGHT FOUND. BLOG (Oct. 24, 2014, 2:46
PM), http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2014/10/24/revenge-of-the-demo
crats/ [http://perma.cc/W932-DJNX] (showing the increase in Super PAC contributions by Democrats).
333
See Kang, supra note 276, at 1916–19 (describing the lack of partisan
advantage from Super PACs but also explaining the increased importance of the
billionaire mega-donor who could fund a presidential campaign by himself).
334
See, e.g., VOGEL, supra note 8, at 55–76, 225–42 (reporting internal divisions in the Democratic Party and Democracy Alliance over economic and campaign finance issues).

R

R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-3\CRN301.txt

606

unknown

Seq: 76

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

16-MAR-16

15:47

[Vol. 101:531

high-level party campaign finance and worry more, along with
their Republican counterparts, about the growing influence of
outside groups in the Super PAC era.335 The split among Democrats manifests itself not only on issues of campaign finance,
but more generally over issues of economic inequality and financial regulation.336
My concern here is less romantic whimsy about participatory politics than a basic representational worry that the
structure of American politics is struggling to register the interests of average citizens and that further deregulation may go
too far in exacerbating how poorly campaign finance law serves
most Americans.337 Putting aside the constitutional analysis,
purely as a policy matter, any deregulation of party campaign
finance should proceed with its distributional impact as a more
important normative priority.
CONCLUSION
Shortly after Citizens United, I wrote that the decision
marked the end of campaign finance law as we knew it.338 I
meant at the time mainly that the decision led a cascade of
legal developments that had already begun transforming campaign finance law and practice. Over the longer run, though,
the constitutional reasoning ultimately leading us down the
doctrinal path to the party- or even candidate-connected Super
PAC may prove my quip truer than I would have guessed. That
said, this doctrinal path is not an inevitable one, even under
the Roberts Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence so far.
The narrow dyadic framework for the Court’s understanding of
335
See Molly Ball, The Battle Within the Democratic Party, ATLANTIC (Dec. 23,
2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/12/the-battle-within
-the-democratic-party/282235/ [http://perma.cc/9U6C-L7SN]; Zachary A.
Goldfarb, More Liberal, Populist Movement Emerging in Democratic Party Ahead of
2016 Elections, WASH. POST (Nov. 30, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/more-liberal-populist-movement-emerging-in-democratic-party-ahead-of
-2016-elections/2013/11/30/6729a850-53a7-11e3-9e2c-e1d01116fd98_story.
html [http://perma.cc/P5RH-3EVY]; David J. Lynch, Inside the Democratic Party
Split: Pragmatists Vs. True Believers, BLOOMBERG POL. (Dec. 19, 2014, 5:00 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2014-12-19/populists-press-demo
crats-to-ease-clintonera-embrace-of-bankers [http://perma.cc/YJ5H-ZY7P]; see
also Kate Andrias, Separations of Wealth, 18 J. CONST’L L. (forthcoming 2016)
(manuscript at 19–25) (presenting the political science on the Democratic Party’s
rightward shift and its policy consequences).
336
See supra note 335.
337
See Stephanopoulos, supra note 318, at 1442–47 (arguing that the representational impact of campaign finance regulation should influence its
constitutionality).
338
See Kang, supra note 7, at 21–27.

R
R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-3\CRN301.txt

2016]

unknown

Seq: 77

THE BRAVE NEW WORLD

16-MAR-16

15:47

607

quid pro quo corruption can be extended to encompass the risk
of group-level quid pro quo arrangements that would constitutionally support the regulation of party-related campaign finance. It is decidedly unlikely that the Roberts Court will
deviate too sharply from Jim Bopp’s planned endgame to adopt
such an approach, but a future Court just might someday. The
time is now for the intellectual groundwork leading to an alternative approach, one that builds on the basic quid pro quo
analysis without absurd limitations on the government’s compelling interest in effectively combating corruption.

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-3\CRN301.txt

608

unknown

Seq: 78

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

16-MAR-16

15:47

[Vol. 101:531

